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by
Shih-Liang Tu
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on June
2nd, 1986 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores key questions in the design of an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process in both the
developed and developing countries. It draws lessons from the
experiences of both types of nations in order to shape Taiwan's
EIA system. In exploring and examining these issues, the
literature is reviewed, and a case study is performed on EIA
problems in Taiwan. The emphasis is more on institutional
settings than on technical or procedural aspects. In the
conclusion, the literature review and case study are
comparatively analyzed in order to reach a set of propositions
from which Taiwan may learn. Some recommendations on improving
Taiwan's EIA system are then presented. The conclusion of this
thesis is summarized as followed:
. Administrative discretion should be avoided in the process
of EIA by specifying criteria in the screening stage.
. Formalized public participation channels should be provided
during both EIA's screening and review processes.
. Government should respond to the public's growing
environmental concerns by implementing EIA effectively.
. EIA should be used to broaden cost-benefit analysis in
project planning. Also, its use as a means of economic
benefit for a developing economy; a vehicle to choose among
long-term, multi-dimensional development schemes; and a
planning apparatus to achieve a more comprehensive planning
process should be valued.
. Environmental managers and planners should be trained for
effective EIA implementation. In addition, a national
ecological inventory system should be established for better
EIA data. The ability of both EIA model selection and
application should also be strengthened by accumulating
experience in performing EIAs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lawrence Susskind
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 What is Environmental Imapct Assessment (EIA) ?
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures have been
adopted in many countries, both developed and developing, since
1970. They were first introduced in the United States in the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) enacted in 1969.
EIA is a systematic way of examing the likely consequences of
proposed projects, policies, or programs. The main objective of
an EIA procedure is to provide decision-makers with a picture of
the likely environmental implications of alternative actions
before decisions are made. The results of such assessments are
typically assembled in documents referred to as Environmental
Impacts Statements (EISs).
An EIS also provides a record of an agency's efforts to
formulate alternatives, predict environmental consequences, and
decide on a desirable course of action. At present, the typical
EIS is required to include information on the following:
1. Environmental impacts of the proposed action.
2. Any adverse effects (negative impacts) which cannot be avoided
if the action is implemented.
3. Alternatives to the proposed action.
4. The relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity.
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5. Any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved if the proposed action were carried
out (U.S. NEPA, Section 102(2)(c)).
The requirement of an EIA procedure calls for more than a
mere listing of the actions that the agency is considering.
Rather, a comparative analysis of the environmental consequences
of all of the alternatives is required. Such an analysis must
include the "no-action" alternative. This requirement is
intended to give both decision-makers and the public an
understanding of the environmental and economic costs and gains
associated with each alternative (Ortolano, 1984).
EIA was developed in the United States in the late 1960's as
a direct consequence of increased public awareness of the
negative environmental and social effects of development.
Concern for the environmental quality was, at that time, an
important political factor. Such increased concern for the
environment was not confined to the U.S., but manifested itself
in most industrialized countries as well. The use of EIA as an
integral component of project appraisal is rapidly gaining
influence in many parts of the world.
EIA's procedural advantages are numerous and are becoming
widely recognized. It is not universally applicable, however, in
the form it takes in the U.S. (see Diagram 1.1). It is
interesting to see the process in which it has emerged and
continue to evolve, first in the United States, then in the more
industrialized countries, and more recently, in the developing
8
Draft EIS is
distributed
by agency
Comments
are returned
to agency
Final EIS is
distributed
by agency
Waiting period required prior to implementation of proposed action
DIAGRAM 1. 1 Process of review and comment on a draft EIS. Adapted from R. K. Jain,
L. V. Urban, and G. S. Stacey, Environmental Impact Analysis, A New Dimension in
Decision Making, 2nd ed., Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., copyright 0 1981 by Litton
Educational Publishing, Inc.
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countries. There are, among other factors, marked differences in
the political and administrative traditions of these countries,
which help to explain the varying degrees of effectiveness in
implementing the EIA whihin those countries (O'Riordan and
Sewell, 1981).
1.2 EIA In Developed Countries
During the late 1960's, the protection of the environment
and the desire for a sustainable use of resources became a matter
of great public concern in North America and Western Europe. At
the same time, international awareness of environmental problems
increased, focusing on both resources and the environmental
problems that international trade and development had created.
The general public, as well as various interest groups, urged
their governments to take action to prevent public and private
entities from ignoring both the costs they levied on other parts
of society and the long-term loss of productivity for future
generations caused by their present actions. Governments and
international interest groups alike urged international
organizations to develop an acceptable apparatus for resolving
international environmental protection and resource productivity
policies.
When the U.S. government decided to pass an environmental
policy act, it recognized the need for some procedural guidelines
which would require public agencies to predict the effects of
10
their actions and to coordinate these predictions with the
interests of other parties. EIA was thus included as a major
component of the 1970 NEPA. Procedurally and technically., it was
considered to be an instrument for ensuring that public actions
were both sustainable and environmentally sound.
The NEPA stated national goals and objectives. It also
contains the EIS as a remarkable action-forcing provision. The
procedures for preparation and review of EISs are promulgated by
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEO)., which is composed of
three presidential appointees and located in the Executive Office
of the President. The CEQ has no line authority over other
agencies but does have a powerful coordinating ability, should
the president choose to exercise it.
NEPA requires agencies to prepare a "detailed statement" on
the environmental impacts of "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of human environment". This provision
increased substantially the amount of information agencies
considered and disseminated before it made decisions. The
decision-making process used by federal agencies has thus been
modified fundamentally by the EIS requirements. For all federal
actions that are not "categorically excluded" (i.e. that are
minor or unlikely to have significant environmental effects), a
preliminary analysis is first used to determine whether
anticipated impacts wil be significant enough to require an EIS.
If the agency finds that no significant impacts are likely to
occur, it follows CEQ (1978a) procedure for making that
11
information public. The decision not to prepare an EIS is then
subject to public review and may be challenged by any citizen.
If the preliminary analysis indicates that significant impacts to
the environment are likely, the agency must prepare an EIS and
give an opportunity to all interested parties to comment on the
analysis and conclusions.
A principal task of those preparing an EIS is to forecast
impacts of alternative actions. Within this context, "impacts"
are defined as "the difference between the future state of the
environment if the action took place and if no action occurred"
(Munn. 1979). The goal of the EIS procedure is to require
federal agencies to use the forecasts of future environmental
consequences to evaluate alternatives thoroughly. This
evaluation includes environmental, economic, and engineering
considerations, and requires value judgements about how much
environmental quality is to be "traded-off" to gain other
dimensions of human well-beings such as economic benefits.
In the U.S., the favorable convergence of several important
factors ushered in the introduction of the EIA system. The major
factors were: (a) the wide publicity given to and growing
awareness of the environmental repercussion of resources
development schemes; (b) effective mobilization of a citizen-
based environmental movement; and (c) the occurrence of the first
two factors at a time when the courts were tightening their
review of decision-making in the various federal government
agencies (Anderson, 1973). Similiar development were seen in
many developed countries. By the early 1970's, the political
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atmosphere in these countries had become receptive to NEPA-like
policy reform. O'Riordan and Sewell concluded from several case
studies (1981) that EIA-type developments in project assessment
would have occurred in many Western countries in the 1970's even
without the passage of U.S.'s NEPA. The emergence of
industrialized countries' EIA therefore took place during a
period when environmental protection began to be viewed as an
important political objective( Abracosa,1985).
The situation of EIA in European countries is, however,
still somewhat different from that in the U.S. in a number of
respects. In most European countries a substantial body of
regulations for the consideration of land use and environmental
issues already existed, and was often long-established. In
particular, zoning laws, which require some kind of assessment of
potential impacts on the environment, have existed for a many
years and serve to limit the creation of "nuisance". Moreover,
these laws are administrated in a much more integrated structure
than that in the U.S., as the phenomena of competing
jurisdictions between different levels of administration is less
widewspread in Europe than in the U.S. Generally, a sense of
hierarchy underlies all administrative structure.
Futhermore, in the European political and legal setting,
major efforts were made to get the legislation correct at the
first attempt, since the opportunity for subsequent adjustment
either through the courts or through legislative review often
does not exist for constitutional reasons (Von Moltke, 1984). As
13
a consequence, the introduction of EIA is a more complex process
in Europe than in the U.S., and took longer to materialize.
A major exception is France, which adopted such legislation
as part of its Natural Protection Act in 1976, mandating the
preparation of EIS for all public or private development
projects. The reason for the relative rapidity of French EIA was
that the implementation of such legislation is firmly in the
hands, and very much at the discretion, of the administration
(Clark et al, 1984). It is notable that the French EISs tends to
be brief documents and well-illustrated.
In 1975, Federal Republic of Germany introduced a cabinet
resolution entitled "Principles for the Environmental Impacts
Assessment of Federal Actions" which recommended procedures to be
followed in conducting EIS. The Principles defined the content
of an EIA and indicated the circumstances in which an EIS should
be conducted. A wide range of federal projects were potentially
covered by the Principle. The Principles were, however,
basically an executive resolution, rather than a law which could
be enforced by the courts. If a federal agency decided to
conduct an EIA, the Principles guide the entire procedure. They
required that the environmental consequences of proposed actions
be predicted and evaluated, and the authorities were urged to
find ways to avoid or reduce adverse environmental effects.
In the United Kingdom, there have been some attempts at
materializing the EIA systems since the early 1970's (Catlow and
Thirl wall, 1976). There is, however, no formal requirement for
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EIA in the U.K. Land use planning, as well as pollution control
legislation and procedures, embody both comprehensive project
appraisal mechanisms and environmental protection standards and
measures. Nevertheless, EIA has been carried out on an ad hoc
basis by developers and public agencies within the context of
public inquiries about development decisions, in the hope of
smoothing the process of obtaining planning permission.
The Netherlands has been the driving force in the
development of state-of-the-art EIA in Europe. In the mid-
1970's, the Dutch government announced its intention to submit
legislation of EIA. Since then, it has been engaged in an
"protracted exercise of testing and analysis to define the best
approach to the EIA issue" (Jones, 1984). The Dutch government
finally introduced its Bill on EIA to the Parliament in May,1981.
The Bill sets out the requirements of EIA in greater detail than
has been previously undertaken anywhere else in Europe. Though a
period of legislative evolution is expected, the action taken by
the Netherlands is likely to provide important clarification for
all the European countries.
The European Community has proposed a Directive on EIA that,
if ratified, would be binding on the member states. The
Directive proposes that, for defined categories of projects, the
developer should submit an EIS when applying for authorization of
such a project. The responsible authority should make this
report public and consult with other relevant authorities before
making its own assessment of the likely significant effects of
the proposed project. The authority's assessment should be
15
published together with the decision on the project. The
Directive, which has gone through more than twenty drafts, is
currently under deliberation by the Council of the European
Communities. If ratified, it is likely that the member states
will have negotiated some modifications to the provisions (
Haigh, 1983; Lee and Wood, 1980).
The Japanese cabinet in 1972 issued an administrative
guidance minute that public works under the jurisdiction of the
national government should be reviewed prior to construction to
avoid the worst environmental impacts. The Environmental Agency
established an EIA department and has attempted to persuade the
Diet to adopt draft legislation for requiring EIA, but other
government ministeries have blocked this legislation. Various
ministries have, however, published EIA guidelines and carried
out ad hoc assessments of their own projects. Japan's municipal
governments, under greater pressure from local environmental
interests, and responsible for local land use decisions, have, in
a few cases, adopted EIA procedures. However, there is a marked
preference for confining any action to administrative guidelines
rather than legally enforceable procedures (Hase, 1981; Kato et
al, 1961).
Australia also legislated its EIA system in the mid-1970's.
In New Zealand, major projects requiring government
auhthorization may also be subject to an EIA, though there is no
direct legislation relating specifically to EIA.
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1.3 EIA In Developing Countries
In contrast to the developed countries, the political
atmosphere in the developing countries did not readily encourage
the spontaneous development of anything similar to the developed
countries' environmental movement in the late 1960's and early
1970's. Actually, prior to the 1972 United Nations Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm, many developing countries
viewed the environmental protection issues with significant
suspicion. Concerns for the environment were thought to be
either irrelevant or antithetical to the more pressing problems
of underdevelopment (Johnson, 1970). There has been, however, a
significant shift in this attitude since the late 1970's among
many developing countries due to their past failure in
development schemes which focused solely on economic growth.
This experience enhanced the felt need for adopting a more
integrated approach to development that would address not only
the national growth of economy and concern for social equity but
the preservation of the environmental resource base as well.
Many developing countries' governments now regard environmental
concerns as a basic part of the overall planning endeavor (
Bassow, 1979). There are some developing countries, particularly
in Southeast Asia, which have their own EIA incorporated into the
planning processe5 more acLtively than others (Jalal and Thami,
1979).
Thailand and the Philippines have both been involved
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actively with EIA. In Thailand, the National Environmental
Quality Act, as amended in 1978, authorizes the National
Environment Board (NEB) to issue notification of the categories
and magnitude of projects for which EIA is required. The agency
responsible for permitting these projects should submit an EIA
report, completed according to NEB guidelines, concerning the
study and measures for the prevention and remedy of adverse
environmental effects to the NEB for approval before further
proceedings. The NEB has the authority to compel the production
of information about the environmental impact of any proposed
activity, but it lacks the power to issue regulations
establishing a routine requirement for the submission of such
data.
Environmental policy in the Philippines is embodied in
Presidential Decrees. There is a formal EIA requirement,
commanded in 1977, which is administered by the National
Environmental Protection Council (NEPC) under the supervision of
the Ministry of Human Settlements. Proponents of projects are
required to submit EIA reports to the NEPC which identifies lead
agencies responsible for enforcing the EIA requirements within
the government's permit system. Guidelines published in 1979 for
EIA preparation are similar to the US's NEPA mode. The EIA
Review Committee of the NEPC examines project descriptions and,
in some cases, may issue an Environmental Exemption Certificate
if the project shall have minimal effects on the environment.
Otherwise, the proponent must prepare an EIS for examination by
the EIA Review Committee (Lesaca, 1982; UNESCAP, 1982).
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The Republic of Korea enacted the Environmental Preservation
Law in 1977, which required the EIA for major government
projects. This was further strengthened by the establishment of
Office of Environment (OOE) in 1981. In Brazil, the National
Environmental Policy Law, which was enacted in 1981, established
the EIA system; Kenya, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic have
also introduced procedures for the impact assessment of certain
projects. In Iran, section 7 of the Environmental Protection and
Enhancement Act authorized the Department of Environment to
require EIS in 1974. Malaysia and Indonesia both have programs
or acts which make provisions for the creation of EIA a
requirement for certain type of projects, though at present no
legal requirement has been established. EIA was conducted in
countries like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Singapore on an
ad hoc basis.
There is increased interest in developing countries in
seeing that major projects are assessed, to ensure that likely
environmental adverse impacts are avoided or ameliorated and
beneficial effects enhanced. EIA is seen as a means for
achieving this goal. This interest is shared by some major
multilateral and bilateral international aid agencies.
As environmental awareness has increased, the Inter-American
Development Bank has altered its assessmnet procedures to include
the environmental factors. The Operations Manual Statement of
the World Bank requires that environmental effects be considered
during the project cycle by the Regional Office with the
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assistance and supervision of its Office of Environmental
Affairs. Since projects proposals are initially prepared by
potential borrowers, the Bank does not have a formal requirement
for EIA, but requires project proposals to demonstrate that
sufficient attention has been paid to possible environmental
problems. In general the World Bank is more concerned about the
quality of environmental analysis and implementation plans than
in the procedure or tools for assessment. In reality the Office
of Environmental Affairs is too small and not powerful enough to
exercise comprehensive review of the Bank's operations (Horberry,
1984).
The US Agency for International Development (AID) is unique
among development agencies in that it must conform to a legally
binding set of environmental assessment procedures. The origin
of this legal requirement is NEPA, but it is actually mandated by
the Foreign Assistance Act. The interpretation of USAID's
responsibilities and the manner of implementation have evolved
over the years. They also reflect the procedural changes in EIA
implementation embodied in CEQ regulations under NEPA and an
Executive Order concerning the environmental effects abroad of
major federal actions.
The assessment requirements exclude certain project
categories that are unlikely to have any adverse effects.
Normally a two tier assessment procedure is reuqired which is
designed to screen proposals for likely significant impacts which
need further assessment. USAID also prepared numerous project
planning guidelines designed to assist the implementation of its
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environmental procedures in certain sectors by bureau and mission
staff. It has several Indefinite Quantity Contracts with
consulting firms and academic institutions for the conducting of
environmental assessments and environmental profiles of countries
which receive aid. Recently USAID has allocated considerable
funds to the Environmental Planning and Management Programme
administered by the Joint Evnironmental Service of both
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)
and International Union of Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (IUCN). This program identifies and deploys the
appropriate technical and planning expertise needed to implement
the assessment procedures and other environmental planning tasks
(USAID, 1983; Hgrberrqy 1983, Johnson and Blake, 1980).
In 1984, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) established an
Environmental Unit that is responsible for ensuring the
environmental soundness of funding activities and managing the
environmental projects that the ADB supports. The unit has no
formal enforceable procedures, but it attempts to persuade
project staff to incorporate environmental analysis into various
key stages in the project cycle, and screens various project
documents and decisions for possible environmental problems.
In most of the developing countries that are attempting to
incorporate EIA into their system, the procedures adopted are
more or less similar to those of the U.S. As a consequence of
limited understanding of EIA, the actual implementation and level
of performance in most developing countries has been quite poor (
21
Sudara, 1984). As will be discussed in later section, many
problems need to be resolved in order to maximize the benefit of
EIA.
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1.4 Key Questions In the Design of An EIA Process
There are a number of questions that must be analyzed in
designing an EIA process for either a developed or a developing
country. Much of the focus has been on the techiques that should
be used. This is unfortunate. It is more appropriate to
emphasize the outcomes that EIA is meant to define.
1.4.1 How much administrative discretion is appropriate ?
Administrative discretion greatly affects the effectiveness
of the EIA process. In West Germany, since its Principles take
the form of a cabinet resolution rather than a law, they were not
enforced by the courts. Unlike the citizens groups and
individuals in the U.S., those in West Germany had no mechanism
to force the implementation of EIA. Kennedy (1981) commented
that since the ministers had the discretion of deciding whether
an EIS would be needed, West Germany was still far from
integrating the EIA into both agency projects planning and
decision-making processes (Ortolano,1984).
Austrlia established the "Environmental Protection (Impact
of Proposals) Act", EP(IP)A, in 1974. It differs from the U.S.
NEPA in that the minister responsible for the project(the "action
minister") is the only one who can decide that an EIS is
required. This leaves much room for executive discretion. It is
not surprising that, as reported by Hollick(1980), only 55 EISs
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were perpared under EP(IP)A between 1974 and 1980. In this
period, the U.S. has had well over 5500 EISs done (CEQ, 1981).
The relatively small( and inadequate) number of Australian EISs
reflects, in view of the political climate in the late 1970's,
the power of ministers to exercise discretion. As seen in many
other developed and developing countries, administrative
discretion hampered the basic intent of EIA system by allowing
projects with potential impacts to avoid filing an EIS. It is,
therefore, crucial to EIA's effectiveness to ask how much
administrative discretion is appropriate or should be allowed.
1.4.2 How should public participation in EIA be encouraged
and what form should it take?
In many developing countries, lack of adequate channels for
public participation decreased the potential effectiveness of the
EIA system. Rarely do the governments in the developing
countries encourage such public participation in planning,
litigation, or review of administrative processes as they do in
developed world. In fact, there are many countries in which the
public does not have adequate resources or access to information
that can be used to independently assess or object to major
development schemes, or to influence compliance of EIA. Most of
the pressure for environmental protection and for EIA comes from
technically informed sources, such as universities; and from the
conditions attached to the funding of development projects by
international development assistance agencies. As participation
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is regarded as a means of both effectuationg EIA process and
democratizing the institution, an EIA without participation is an
"incomplete" process. The real concern involves the specifics of
how public participation should be encouraged and in what form
should it take.
1.4.3 How educated and environmental-sensitive must the
population be for an EIA process to succeed?
It should be recognized that, even if there existed
environmental concern in many developing countries, such
awareness does not serve for environmental movement as it does in
developed world (UN Conference on the Human Environment_ Fgunex
Switzerland, 1971). In most of the developing countries, the
environmental efforts did not stem from the broad mobilization of
citizen-groups but rather from the awakening of the elite
planning corps (Abracosa, 1984). Even to the present time, this
awareness is difficult to translate into practiceal mobilization,
especially to the under-educated mass that have to worry about
daily sustenance. This is a fundamental problem in that, a wide,
across-the-population concern to urge for an effective EIA system
is lacking in developing countries. If the educational and
affluence levels are correlated to the degree of general public's
environmental concern, and the degree of concern can affect EIA's
success, the issue that needs to be addressed is how educated and
environmentally sensitive must the population be for an EIA to
succeed.
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1.4.4 How can EIA assist in widening the range of cost-
benefit in project planning ?
Most projects planning without EIA process appear to have
considered only economic and financial aspects in their cost-
benefit analysis. Such "narrowness" of perspectives made
projects planners and decision-makers unable to take into account
various social, political, and institutional costs. In many
cases, projects turned out disasterously for this reason.
Irreversible environmental impacts may incur undue societal costs
to local communities as well as political costs to decision-
makers. Project appraisal with appropriate timing of EIA, i.e.,
in the early stage of planning, can help broaden the cost-benefit
analysis while avoiding unnecessary costs of all kinds. An
intriguing question is: how can EIA be useful in widening the
range of cost-benefit analysis and what range should be assessed.
1.4.5 How should the economic cost of environmental
degradation and mismanagement be assessed ?
As with other environmental measures, EIA has the utility of
internalizing the externality of developmental activities. More
importantly, it can assist proponents in understanding the
economic consequences of environmental mismanagement, and the
consequent degradation entailed, as well as the economic benefit
26
of employing certain environmental measures. This aspect is
especially meaningful for developing countries where
environmental goals are not put in as high a policy priority as
is economic development. In those countries, therefore, EIA may
serve not only as an environmental tool but also as a powerful
economic instrument. The fact that a country is unaware of such
instrument's usage, as is the case in most of these developing
countries, can cause short-term economic loss, and environmental
loss in the long run. Thus, the manner in which the economic
cost of environmental degradation is assessed in EIA becomes
important to the developing countries' economic development
planning.
1.4.6 What time frame and what dimensions of impacts should
be used in preparing EISs?
For many developing countries, choosing among various long-
term developmental strategies is a hard decision-making problem.
Thoughtful analyses are needed, especially in determining which
kinds of technology are to be employed, what sectors of industry
to be subsidized, and where the public investment should be
allocated. Lack of long-term and multi-dimensional thinking will
result in a misleading developmental path or in inefficient
allocation of resources. EIA may be used as an aid in such a
process. Understanding the potential aftermath of different
options and forseeing the trade-off situations in the long run
may benifit developing countries' policy-making, which is lacking
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in those countries now. In this sense, the time frame and
dimensions of impacts used in preparing EISs will be decisive
factors for the planning process.
1.4.7 How should EIA be linked to overall comprehensive
planning?
The problem of implementing environmental measures in many
developing countries is basically one of effective incorporation
of environmental factors into the overall planning scheme. To be
specific, both coordinating and resolving conflict in the
hierarchy of administration appear to be at the core of this
complicated problem. This not only reflects the fundamental
conflicts in economic and conservational goals in the developing
countries context, it signifies that those countries do not have
sufficient planning apparatus for reaching a comprehensive
planning process. Improving the general planning scheme seems to
be a very laborious job given the fact that institutional setting
of these developing countries has not reached the stage of
sophistication thta developed countries had. EIA may be used as
an effective planning apparatus for such endeavor. What is left
to be explored then is the linkage between EIA and overall
comprehensive planning.
1.4.8 What are the technical problems ?
Some analysts argued that the most important influence on
28
EIA implementation in the developing countries is the quality of
the technical and procedural models used in practice. Most of
the early efforts to stimulate third world interest in EIA
stressed methods and techniques. Other than the "people"
problems in the institutional aspect, misunderstanding and misuse
of the models, lack of base-line ecological data, and inadequate
trained personnels are all the major aspects to the "technical"
problems (Rogue, 1985). It has also been noted that the multi-
disciplinary requirements of preparing an EIS can give rise to
additional difficulties in personnel problem (Sudara, 1984).
Among others, these technical issues influencing EIA's
effectiveness should be addressed.
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CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE ANSWERS ABOUT THE EIA
QUESTIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Formalized and Informalized Bases: Legislative and Legal
Problems
In both the developed and developing countries, different
legislative and legal factors influence both the adoption and
implementation of EIA processes. Within the context of legal and
political culture, this section will seek to explain why NEPA, as
the forerunner of EIA legislations in the 1970's, was adopted and
implemented in U.S. and why similar legislation may not prevail
in other settings. Additionally, a detailed review on the EIA
legislative needs in developing countries will follow, together
with a critical discussion regarding the institution of EIA
legislation.
2.1.1 Legal and political aspects of legislation
The very reception of EIA depends upon the responsiveness of
what might be termed "the political culture" -- the framework of
political institutions, laws, roles and responsibilities - that
shapes policy formation and decision making. In the U.S. the
political culture encouraged a lively response to NEPA for
several reasons:
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First, the U.S. courts are constitutionally guaranteed far
more independence from the executive and legislative branches
than is found in other countries, particularly in developing
countries. It is probably true to say that it was subsequent
judicial interpretation, and not the actions of Congress, which
made NEPA so powerful. Without the prodding of the courts in the
1970's, it is doubtful whether the political and administrative
response to NEPA would have been so profound.
Secondly, it was partly because of the political role of the
courts that NEPA launched an already active environmental lobby
into a new role as a quasi-public watchdog, protecting the nation
from environmental abuse. After hundreds of cases and years of
judicial interpretations, NEPA has "politicized" environmentalism
to the point where a powerful, non-elected coalition representing
largely middle class interests has considerable influence over
both policy formation and decision making (O'Riordan, 1976).
Finally, NEPA has "exploited" the American dislike of
secrecy and the control of information. The 1967 Freedom of
Information Act in effect requires all governmental agencies to
release information unless they can show that do so would be
contrary to the public interest. While many agencies have abused
this provision, it remains true that a great deal of information
and policy analysis leading to decisions which affect the
environment is generally more available to American the public
without the official secrecy and ministerial discretion which
shackle the free flow of information in most developing
countries. Consequently, Americans are almost overwhelmed by a
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sea of detail, and even the most conscientious environmental
pressure groups cannot keep up with the hundreds of EISs that are
produced each month (O'Riordan, 1976; Wade, 1975).
2.1.2 Legislative and regulative aspects:
Among the problems that concern the developing countries is
that of environmental legislation. There are countries with no
laws mandating EIA, which proceed on a case-by-case basis. There
are others with comprehensive laws, regulations and guidelines
covering all aspects of EIA. And, of course, there are many
countries in between. There is no universal model for EIA
legislation. It would be useful, however, for all countries to
have a legislative framework for EIA, which would address several
major environmental and political concerns. First, in
determining which areas require EIA, one of the criteria for
preparing the list of impacts may be special "sensitivity". The
areas that most require EIA in a given country or a region are
those which are most environmentally vulnerable. Second, such a
framework should include a universal list of items to be
considered in an EIA. Third, EIA review and the disputes
arbitration procedure should be identified. Such procedures
differ from country to country. Finally, the legislation should
include penalties for non-compliance with EIAs. In this context,
it may be effective to provide that EIA, in case of non-
compliance, will be carried out by the reviewing body in the
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developing country at the expense of the developer (Ahmad, 1984).
Some critics, however, have argued that the EIS requirement
of NEPA legislation has been a disaster for the environmental
movement in the U.S. (Fairfax, 1978). Environmental groups have
become involved in a process which guarantees only procedural
control over Federal activities. Since the courts, in general,
have only permitted procedural review. Prior to the
implementation of NEPA, agency decisions involving some
development proposals had been successfully challenged in the
courts under existing statutes. Since NEPA became law,
environmental groups have directed their attention towards
reviewing impact statements, in an effort- to find procedural
grounds to initiate litigation, instead of concentrating on
substantive issues. Consequently, it may be argued that
environmental groups have wasted considerable energy and
resources. This constitutes a problem which goes to the core of
EIA implementation (Clark et al. 1980).
2.2 EIA and Comprehensive Planning
Most developing countries now regard environmental concerns
as part of their overall planning process. Many have formulated
national policies and established programs to protect the
environment (Kato et al., 1981). A 1980 survey by the Centre
for International Environmental Information (CIEI) noted that 102
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developing countries had governmental agencies responsible for
the environmental engagement, compared to only eleven in 1972
(CIEI,1980).
It is apparent that what the developing countries need from
an EIA is not simply a report. There must be an integration of
environmental concerns into the planning process from the very
early stages of a project. Such integration permits the
identification of real alternatives which can then be
systematically evaluated and which can produce sound decisions.
(Ahmad, 1984)
There are many problems in integrating EIA into a
comprehensive resource planning process. The problems are most
obvious in developing countries but some remain in the developed
world.
2.2.1 Timing
To date, EIAs seem to have been used in most developing
countries primarily as either remedial instrument or as a means
to justify actions, mainly because EIAs are incorporated into the
overall project planning process at too late a stage (Lim, 1965).
Therefore, EIAs have rarely led to any serious consideration of
alternatives or major modification of initial plans. In
contrast, early timing of EIA effort can actually avoid damage to
the natural and social environment, and could make adjustment to
the project easier (Lo et al. 1985)
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Usually, the core of the goal behind EIA, that is, the
realization of the most socially cost-beneficial alternative to
the proposed action, can be better attained with early initiation
of EIA (Clark, 1984).
2.2.2 Public Participation:
Both private and public sector developers are aware that a
failure to identify and consider issues of public concern may
lead to the delay or abandonment of their proposals. This is a
particularly serious problem in the United States because of the
power of individual citizens to challenge decisions on projects
by initiating litigation in the courts (Clark, 1980).
Practical difficulties in identifying those sections of the
community to be consulted and in determining the most appropriate
means of consultation are encountered by those preparing an EIS.
These issues must be addressed, because the validity of the
results of an impact statement may depend upon the degree of
public involvement to which the assessment process is subjected
(Bishop, 1975).
The timing of participation is an important consideration in
the assessment process. Administratively, the favored option
seems to be to delay participation until a late stage in the
project planning process, when an impact statement provides a
focus for participation. In addition, participation at this
stage is easy to organize. Advocates of this approach argued
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that participation before an EIS has been prepared will be based
on partial knowledge, prejudice and misconceptions unless
detailed information is available (Solandt, 1977).
Alternatively, it has been argued that there are
considerable benefits in initiating participation early in the
planning process (Gelhorn, 1975; Hggg, 1975). Early public
involvement increases the probability that the proposals which
are formulated will take account of public concerns. In
addition, such involvement would reduce delays in obtaining
project authorization, because many critical issues will have
been resolved. Public involvement during impact assessment would
ensure that issues of public concern can be considered during
appraisal. Also, individuals and groups interested in a proposal
may be valuable sources of information on areas likely to be
affected by a project (Bisset et al. 1980).
2.2.3 EIA's Coverage and Validity:
In some cases, EIA procedure does not apply and even appears
invalid. For instance, in the U.S., Congress has been prepared
to intercede when compliance with NEPA has conflicted with other
national priorities. In the case of Trans-Alaska Pipeline,
considerable delay did occur. However, when the project appeared
to be deadlock, Congress approved legislation exempting the
proposal from any further review under the Act. The 1976 Alaskan
Natural Gas Transportation Act precluded judicial review of the
EIS. Similiarly, Congress allowed the Atomic Energy Commission
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to issue permit to nuclear power plant when project was delayed
in the courts (Beard,1975). In light of the fact that the total
amount of exemption is small in view of the claims of delay, it
is suggested that Congress does not consider that the
disadvantages of occasional delay to outweigh the benefit of the
EIA requirement (Clark,1980).
According to Lowry (1985), however, private sector
investments in many countries are not covered at all by
requirements for the coordination or preparation of an EIA. In
many developing countries, government-chartered corporations are
exempt from mechanisms that coordinate normal governmental
agencies. In addition, even some governmental agency projects
are exempted from having to prepare an EIA (e.g.,energy projects)
when they are so important that it is felt that no delay or
diversion can be countenanced. In the Philippines, for example,
any Minister may initiate a request for an exemption. If he does
so, however, the NEPC (National Environmental Protection Council)
then will place full public responsibility for any adverse
consequences on his agency. This can be regarded as intentional
negligence of EIA, with priortized goals, in a overall planning
scenario (Cargenter, 1985).
2.3 Inter-governmental Coordination
The machinery in place for the implemention of EIA by public
agencies within the hierachy of government has a great deal to do
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with the performance of EIA. There are several considerations,
discussed below.
2.3.1 Status and Authority:
The status and authority of the EIA-responsible agency has
been the major problem in developing countries, though it happens
in the developed world as well. One of the common impediments to
successful implemenation of EIA relates to the limited authority
of the review agency. This limitation arises in part from the
relatively lower status of the review agency in the governmental
hierarchy. Such agencies in these countries also suffer from a
lack of both resources and technical competency. These
circumstances tend to weaken their legal and persuasive authority
vis-a-vis that of other participants in the EIA implementation
process (Lim, 1985). The status of the review agency within each
government's hierarchy must be raised. It is known that the
central environmental unit in developing countries usually
function at a governmental level that is too low to compete
equally with other groups which also have an interest in
development planning. These environmental units are both
inadequately funded and insufficiently staffed for the tasks
assigned to them. Most importantly, they are not consulted at
the inception of the decision-making process for economic
development planning or natural resource management. In most
cases, the course of projects and their soundness in terms of
conservation and environmental quality can be best determined and
controlled early in the process (Lim, 1985).
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Environmental agencies at the subministerial level find it
difficult to participate in policy formulation and decision
making. Other priorities with the ministry (e.g. health or
energy) may obscure, dilute, or distort the objective of
sustainable use (Carpenter et al, 1985). Lower level agencies
are at thus a hierarchical disadvantage in commenting on the
practices of other ministries .
However, though the number of developing countries having
environmental agencies had reached 110 in 1985, those agencies
ranged from a full-fledged ministry of environment at one extreme
to one or two officials sitting in the office of Premier or
President at the other. Some argued that the ministers might not
necessarily be the most effective in implementing EIA, because
the officials in the Premier's office may sometimes wield more
power, obtain cooperation from related ministers, and secure
coordination (Ahmad, 1984). It is, therefore, hard to judge what
kind of "machinery" may be the most effective for EIA
implementation.
In the area of international assistance agencies, the level
of attention devoted to EIA by the main UN agencies, including
UNEP, is likely to add more formal legitimacy to an EIA policy in
a developing country. Delegates return home from conferences or
training seminars bearing official publications or declarations
that support whatever claims they may have on governmental
authority and resources, and may usually have more say in the
hierarchical context (Horberry, 1985).
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2.3.2 Roles Definition and Re-alignment
The low level of EIA performance in some developing
countries has also been affected by the extent to which the roles
of the various participants have been clearly defined.
Procedural rules of EIA implementation without a clearer division
of labor seem to create considerable role ambiguity and decrease
accountability. Therefore, Lim (1965) suggested that EIA
procedural rules must clearly define both the roles and the
interactions of EIA participants.
The role of various governmental agencies not only needs
clearer definition but also some extent of re-alignment. In the
past, most proponents of development within developing countries
rejected any environmental considerations. EIA may now be viewed
as an instrument for long-term institutional change and EIA
systems regarded as a policy tool for institutional adaptation.
The successful implementation of EIA requires ongoing
restructuring of its institutional framework. The initial
prescription of an EIA system should be accompanied by a
monitoring scheme to evaluate the system's performance outcome.
Monitoring, as Lim (1965) described, should be followed by
successive reformulations. Thereafter, a restructured framework
according to realigned roles and values may result in better
coordination among agencies and a higher level of EIA performance
(Yiu, 1984; Abracos, 1984).
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2.4 Transferring EIA and Culture-Specific Questions
To a large extent, EIA experiences and expertise were
transferred from developed countries such as U.S. to the
developing ones. Recently, however, home-grown wisdom and
understanding has become favored over foreign expertise in these
"host" countries. This was a result of the growing awareness of
the risks of bringing in foreign "experts", who lack knowledge of
local conditions, and, being thus unable to properly grasp the
need of local community, often prepare EISs which are wrong or
misleading (Curi, 1961). It has been argued by Ahmad (1984) that
EIA should be carried to as great an extent as possible, by
domestic experts. Foreign experts, however qualified, cannot
replace those who have knowledge of the nation and culture. It
is not simply that the domestic experts understand the cultural
context and the functional relationships better, but that they
may also be able to create a political awareness or "lobby"
within the country for the implementation of the EIA. Foreign
experts, for all of their expertise, may prepare volumes of
excellent EISs which could find themselves on the shelves of the
Prime Ministers' or the Presidents' office with no action taken.
(DSE/UNEP, 1984)
Other observers have noted that even the most sensitively
crafted and carefully adapted techniques will fail to produce the
intended effect unless they are used in an institutional
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environment properly designed to make use of their results
(Murelius, 1981). The simple notion of a decade ago, that all
developing countries could and should use the same organizational
and procedural arrangements to take advantage of EIA (Munn,
1979), has given way to the view that different countries will
need to organize differently (Wandesforde-Smith et al. 1985).
With regard to the technical capacity of developing
countries to implement an EIA policy, there are numerous
guidelines, training courses, and consultants eager to transfer
their expertise. Not all of these "products" are directly useful
to environmental agencies. Also, the lack of technical expertise
is not necessarily the greatest barrier to implementation. Many
of the available guidelines were written to satisfy the interests
of international organizations, not to meet the needs of domestic
environmental agencies. Although there are some exceptions in
cases where agencies have commissioned their own guidelines,
many available materials simply reformulate traditional NEPA-
style procedures and methods that with each republication, become
further removed from real implementation conditions and would
hardly be judged appropriate in most developed countries. The
same situation can be said for EIA training courses. In
addition, most workshops and seminars, while having some benefits
for participants, do not succeed in transmitting methods which
are likely to be sustainable or affordable in devloping
countries. Possibly the best efforts of integrating foreign
expertise are those connected to real projects or those based on
well-designed practical case studies (Horberry, 1985).
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2.5 Practicality and Cost-Effectiveness
For most developing countries, problems of cost-
effectiveness is a matter of much more seriousness than it is in
the developed world, though such problems are, of course,
important to all nations.
A major criticism about EIA and thus results in relunctance
to conduct it is because that EIA causes considerable costs and
delay. Initially, EIA may be expensive to implement, especially
in the area where little is known about its existing
environmental and social conditions. Design changes due to EIS
findings also increase capital cost. It of course may be argued
that savings to local, regional, and even national
economiesarising from the avoidance of undesirable impacts will
outweigh the costs in the long run. Clark (1984) commented that
once the procedures and techniques are established, the costs of
EIA system will decline, and effectiveness may demonstrate
further.
Most of the developing countries do not have the money to
carry out costly experiments. High cost of preparing EISs have
made EIA system not attractive to most developing countries. The
"expensive" and "complicated" characteristics of EIS, as
commented by participants in 1964 DSE/UNEP Conference, must be
improved in order to draw attention on the benefit of effective
EIA implementation from developing countries.
Developing countries lack not only money, but technical
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expertise, equipment, instruments, and data. These constraints
make it an absolute necessity to make EIA processes as simple and
practical as possible (Cockerell. 1984). Sophisticated models
and academically interesting ideas should be avoided if they are
not essential. It is necessary to tailor the available solutions
to a number of specific problems which arise in carrying out
EIAs. This does not mean that developing countries should be put
off with second rate or inferior EIAs. but that the methods must
be practical, directed in a straight-forward manner to the
problems at hand. (Ahmad, 1984)
Cost-effective EIAs may nevertheless be carried out through
scoping and screening procedures. Those procedures can eliminate
activities that do not need EIA and can also reduce the number of
impacts to consider. Through proper environmental legislation it
is also possible to avoid costly delays in the implementation of
projects (DES/UNEP, 1984). A judicious selection process should,
therefore, limit both the number of impacts to be studied and the
depth to which they are studied, under the constraints of the
limited resources in a developing economy. Over-zealousness can
make EIA both impractical and cost-ineffective.
Alternatively, being "under-zealous" would also cause
problems. Oversimplified EIA models with inadequate baseline
data, experts, and analytic works, can make preparation of the
EIS but a perfunctory job, which may lead to either undue
endorsements of projects or unnecessary delay (Yien et al. 1985).
Since the quantified impacts are predictions, not facts
themselves, there is an element of uncertainty and risk which is
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inherent in such impact assessment process. The questions to be
asked are: what price are people willing to pay for eliminating
risks and how much uncertainty is tolerated. The criteria of
judging the practicality therefore consists of trade-offs the
decision-makers must make, even before actually implementing EIA
(DSE/UNEP, 1984).
2.6 Education and Training
In most countries, the lower level of performance of EIA
systems can be explained by the attitude of the responsible
agencies toward EIA. Responsible agencies are not found to be
sufficiently conscious of the intention of EIA or are unwilling
to initiate changes in their planning and decision-making process
for early and full internalization of EIA (Lim, 1985).
Politicians in most developing countries, who are also the
decision-makers, may not be aware of the possible detrimental
effects of an development activity. Alternatively, the belief
that a proposed development will improve their chances of re-
election may cause them to disregard the long-term effects of the
development, and not to favor the preparation of an EIS
(Curl,1981).
The strenthening of environmental awareness and sensitivity
in public agencies, government officials, politicians, and even
developers appears to be a crucial need in effective EIA
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implementation. Education and training in environmental
conservation and protection, with emphasis on EIA, become very
important. In 1984 Conference of EIA for Development held by
DSE/UNEP in West Germany, a recommendation of Asian working
groups states as follows: environmental education should be
promoted to bring greater awareness to the media, politicians,
consulting firms, universities and other groups whose works may
be relevant for the application of a sound environment policy.
It is also suggested by Ahmad (1984) that problems for developing
countries' environmental education and training is on the need
for management approach, rather than pure technical experts and
methods.
In the U.S. and other developed countries, though EISs'
quality has risen and EIA's role in decision-making process has
become much more appreciated than decade ago, there are still
some training problems (Lee and Wood, 1985).
There is a need for a careful review of training needs; that
is, who needs training and what form that training should take.
It is essential not to omit the training of important categories
of staff such as lawyers and senior managers, and not to assume
that all types of staff need the same type of training. Some
staff will require extensive procedural and substantive training;
others may require only attendance at carefully focused small
workshops.
A distinction should be drawn between specialized technical
training (for example in ecology) and training in EIA methods
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(identification of impacts, comparion of impacts, etc.).
Specialists have often been found to adapt poorly to working in
interdisciplinary EIA teams and to communicate badly, and thus
may require further training to overcome these deficiencies.
While guidelines are widely used and considered valuable,
over-reliance on them may lead to environmental evaluations which
are too descriptive, insufficiently analytical, and poorly
integrated. In addition, post-project studies to determine the
accuracy of predictions need be conducted to increase the-
efficacy of training.
Trainers also need training. Consultants from private firms
and universities have frequently provided the early training,
sharing the knowledge they acquired on the job. The U.S. is now
in a position to provide guidance on training the trainers in
other countries, especially developing countries (Wood, 1984).
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CHAPTER 3 EIA IN TAIWAN : AN HISTORICAL REVIEW
3.1 General Backbround of Taiwan and Its Environmental Problems
3.1.1 An Overview
Taiwan has an area of 35,900 sq km, relatively the same size
as the states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined.
Taiwan's population in 1984 was 19 millions--the second highest
density in the world (528 persons per sq km). With over 70'4 of
its land area covered with uninhabitable high mountains, the
remaining areas of the country are under severe development
pressure. Taiwan has few natural resources. The government of
the Republic of China (ROC) shifted onto Taiwan in 1949 following
the Chinese Communist take-over of the Mainland. Since then,
Taiwan has adopted a series of economic development plans: six
consecutive 4-year economic development plans started in 1953 and
one 6-year plan.
Land-reform was introduced in 1952. It produced significant
changes in tenancy and ownership patterns. It also offered
incentives to farmers to use their land more effeciently and led
to the accelerated migration of farm labor to the cities. Based
on an import-sustitution policy and subsequent export-expansion,
Taiwan has achieved since the mid-1960's significant economic
perf ormance.
There are a number of indicators of this economic
performance:
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1. Taiwan's GNP has grown steadily and rapidly. Averaging growth
of 8.6% a year from 1953 to 1984. The latest 14 years (1971 to
1984) reached an annual average of 8.9%. Per capita GNP rose from
$50 in 1952 to $3,142 in 1985.
2. The average income of the top quintile dropped from 15 times
that of the lowest quintile in 1952, to only four times in
1960's.
3. For the last three decades, the inflation rate averaged less
than 9. per year. The unemployment rate has never exceeded
3%. Foreign reserve exchanges reached a record-high * 25
Billion in 1985.
4. For every hundred households, the average numbers of
telephones in 1984 is 76.9, TV sets is 101.5, and
refrigerators 96.3. These figures are as high as in some
developed countries.
5. The percentage of agricultural labor in the total labor force
decreased from 56% in 1952 to 18.6% in 1983. Industrial
employment has shifted rapidly from textiles in the 1960's, to
petrochemical and steel in the 1970's, to the most recent
electronics.
6. The export of goods and services represented 59% of total GNP
in 1984. The export growth rate averaged 15 % annually from
1953 to 1982, and imports 11.6 %. Taiwan ranked 10th in the
world in terms of total export in 1985 (Sources:
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics,
Executive Yuan, ROC, 1950-1985).
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3.1.2 Taiwan's Environmental Problems
Taiwan's environmental problems are exacerbating with high
densities and rapid industrial development. Deterioration of
air, water quality have become "more and more unbearable"(Ma et
al. 1980). A survey conducted in 1985 showed that 57% of those
interviewed felt "environmental protection should be regarded
as more important than economic development", only 27% argued
"economic development should be treated as more important".
Since the mid-1970's, environmental cases have been heard
frequently and discussed at a national level.
* 1972, Philco-Ford electronics plant near Taipei had
chemical solution polluted drinking water, dozens of workers
injured, five of them died.
* 1978, the world's worst Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN) disaster
occurred in South Taiwan. The chemical plant's leakage caused
407 harmed, 24 hospitalized, and one died.
* 1979, PCB (Poly chlorinated biphenyls) contaminated food
oil in the processing plant. Thousands of victims suffered from
long-term illness for having eaten the oil.
* 1980, Chroline leak in South Taiwan's industrial park,
more than ten thousands were injured.
* 1982, State-owned Taiwan Metals and Minerals Company in
North Taiwan was order to shut down because its levels of
Sulfur Dioxide (SO 2 ) and Nitrogen Oxides (NO.) emission was too
high. The company's year-long emisssion also ruined the nearby
forests.
* 1986, Industrial wastes polluted rivers in South Taiwan's
shell-fish beds, an estimated loss of $ 8 Millions.
The environmental situation in Taiwan can be understood by
the results of a 1986 survey listed below:
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TABLE 3.1
A SURVEY OF THE.ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIONS AT METROPOLITAN TAIPEI CITIZENS
(UnitsX) very some- not not not don't
much what sure much at know
1. Are you usually concerned
about environmentally
related problems?
2. In your opinion, are the
general environmental
pollution problems in
Taiwan bad?
3. In your opnion, are you
harmed by the pollution?
4. Do you agree with someone who
said that the environmental
problems of Taiwan are mainly
caused by the economic
development?
5. Are you inclined to vote
for a legislative candidate
if (s)he strongly advocates
environmental protection?
all
34 42 0 13 7
15 4 9 962
28 27 0 31
29 22 7 17
1
11
16 28 37 5 12
4
6
1
14
2
6. Do you think Taiwan's
environmental problems in
the last 3 to 4 years were
better or worse than now?
7. Do you think Taiwan's en-
vironmental problems in the
next 3 to 4 years will be
better or worse than now?
nuch somewhat
better better
the somewhat
same worse
24 37 20
2
G. Do you know of the BEP?
9. Have you heard of the EIA system?
10. Do you think the BEP has
done a good Job?
11.If the EIA system can
effectively lessen the bad
environmental effects from
the economic development,
would you like to see it
implemented?
8
16 8 23
Yes: 84 No: 16
Yes: 22 No: 78
very some- not
much what sure
10 37 1
37 22 20
much don't
worse know
5 6
24 27
not not don't
much at
all
20 9
know
23
7 3 11
Source: United Daily News, Survey Service Center, Taipei. January
26, 1986.
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Answers to questions 2 and 3 in this survey reflected, by
and large, both the general public's prevalent impressions of
Taiwan's "bad" pollution problems (a total of 77"), and a
relatively high feeling on the part of the public that they are
being harmed by such pollution (a total of 55-4). Question 4's
answers along reflect both an explicit public awareness of the
environmental cost incurred due to economic development and a
strong inclination to protect the environment. This survey
actually displayed a paradigmatic shift, to some extent, in the
general public's impression of a "high-growth/ high-pollution"
economy. The results of question No. 6 and 7 can be understood
as an reflection of the public majority short-term "environmental
perception". They feel that the environmental quality in Taiwan
is worsening: this year is worse than last year, and next year
may be even worse.
Generally, the "bad" environmental situation in Taiwan
originated from several factors:
1. Limited resources and available space, together with a
high population density, make Taiwan extremely susceptible to
developmental pressure. Uncontrolled and unauthorized
developmental activities follow the rule of "tragedy of the
commons" and damage the environment.
2. The national high-growth developmental model forced the
"growth paradigm" to prevail for decades. No environmental
nr-pnrtive wAs considered in the early nlAnnin ng prones prior tn
the mid-1970's. This resulted in a "government-led" polluting
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economy.
3. The compartmentalization of environmental-related
legislations and authorities led to the discoordination of
control functions and fragmented implementation, which left the
inter-related environmental problems unsolved.
4. The enforcement agencies including planning agencies did
not fully understand their duties, were not given enough power,
had unsufficient enforcement powers, and were understaffed.
5. Relatively speaking, public awareness came very late.
Only after the late-1970's have environmental groups gained
influence and wide-spread concern.
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3.2 The Legislative Settings
The "EIA Enforcement Plan" was officially promulgated in
October, 1985. It was actually a joint product, originated from
the executive branch and passed under the accumulated pressure of
the Congressmen in the Legislative Yuan. The Plan underwent a
long process of evolution prior to its promulgation. A major
part of the ROC central governmental mechanism includes that
Congress plays in questioning the executive sector,
particularly with regard to the Premier and Ministers in the
Executive Yuan.
In the last three decades, the first query brought up to the
platform was in 1973, concerning the abuse of fertilizers in
agriculture, which threatened the organic structure of land soil
and eventually harm the cultivation ability of crops. In this
query, Congressman Hwang asked that impacts on the natural
environment from development activities should be paid adequate
attention to. Both the numbers of queries, and the numbers of
Congressmen who made queries on environmental-related issues has
since been growing every year (see Table 3.2 ). It should be
noted that a record-high opposition, to Taiwan's Fourth Nuclear
Power Plant, was recorded in a co-signed query by 61 Congressmen
in 1985, and succeeded in raising public awareness, and in having
the executive sector halt the project.
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TABLE 3.2
ENVIRONMENTALLY RELATED QURIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN, R.O.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Year Times
1973 1
1974 0
1975 1
1976 2
1977 3
1978 5
1979 6
1960 6
1981 9
1982 10
1983 18
1984 22
1985 89*
Note: The co-signed query by 61 Congressmen on the nuclear power
plant was counted 61 times. If counted only one time, 1985's
statistics should be 29.
Sources:
H. H. Michael Hsiao, 1982. " Who Cares About Taiwan's Natural
Environment? China Tribune, 16-8, 188.
Legislative Yuan Public Report, 1982--1985.
Environmental legislation started only after the early
1970's and was compelled by the significant degradation of
environmental qualities. Such legislation included the National
Park Law in 1972; the Urban Planning and Zoning Law in 1973; the
Solid Waste Disposal Law and Clean Drinking Water Act in 1974;
the Air Pollution Control Law in 1975; the Cultural Resources
Protection Law in 1982; and the Natural Ecology Conservation Act
in 1984. This latest legislation on natural resources
conservation was by far the greatest step toward combining
ecological factors with the resource development process.
The Congressmen, being elected by their constituency every
three years, obviously need to be very sensitive and attentive to
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the concerns of the general public, to whom environmental issues
have become increasingly important. In the United Daily Survey
discussed in 3.1, the most interesting formulation of question
No. 5 presents some enlightening suggestions to the legislators,
i.e., that a more forceful environmental advocate has the better
chance to be elected (44% to 17%) and therefore might be regarded
as a better representative of the constituency. Although this
survey's sampling process was conducted in the Metropolitan
Taipei, which is highly urbanized and densely populated, the
result still serves as a useful refernce to Taiwan's "environmen-
tal perception" as 85% of its population is urbanized.
The Congressmen were faced with the lobbying pressure from
various interests groups, in addition to the general constituency
There are three major environmental citizen groups: the Natural
Ecology Conservation Association, founded in 1982; the Society of
Environmental Protection, formed in 1978; and Environmental
Quality Foundation, established in 1984. These groups, together
with the newly organized Environmental Council of the Consumerism
Foundation, Inc. exerted joint efforts in lobbying the
legislative sector to adopt the EIA legislation. The political
and economic influence of the group's leaders made their lobbying
efforts effective. Occasionally, local Rotary, Lion Clubs and
other business associations also join some environmental-related
campaigns initiated by the environmentalists groups on an ad-hoc
base.
The advocacy of college professors and other academians,
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though somewhat un-organized, apparently played a crucial role in
educating the public and in bringing new EIA concepts to Taiwan.
For example, an "EIA Problem Workshop", jointly sponsored by the
National Taiwan University's Graduate Schools of Environmental
Engineering and Geography, and the China Times Daily, was held in
June, 1985. Some 80 academians, environmentalists, Congressmen,
and public officials attended. More than fifteen papers and case
studies were presented. It was understood by the Congressmen
that their capacity for effective representation may only be
strenghtened only if their environmental perspectives were
broadened through interaction with both the environmental groups
and the academics.
Outside factors, seems to me, also influenced the formal
adoption of the EIA by the legislative sector. Unlike other
developing countries, however, Taiwan has no mandate from
international development organizations (e.g. United Nations or
the World Bank) because its seat was taken by the People's
Republic in early 1970's. The external influences were, instead,
academic and technically-oriented. Two groups are most
influential. The first consistsof foreign environmental planning
and resource conservation experts. Ian McHarg belongs to this
group. Their advise through presentations, published articles,
or interactive discussions, provided Taiwan with critical
insights as to how EIA is used in industrialized countries.
The other group basically has the same characteristics, but
has somewhat different intentions, and perhaps has an even more
significant influence. This group consists of Taiwan-born and/or
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grown Chinese who now serve as environmental specialists in the
developed world's. They are invited annually to a conference
known as National Development Conference. Every year, different
participants are invited back to Taiwan. Since most are well-
established scholars or experts in their respective fields, their
discussions, which follow certain scheduled topics set by the
government, are usually instructive and far-sighted in
addressing the nationally-concerned problems. Due to their
strong identification with Taiwan as their home country, their
commitment to solving Taiwan's environmental problems are often
expressed in indepth queries, intensive debates, and critical
comments. The government, in turn, usually values their advices
highly. In factsuggestions for the enforcement of EIA system
was one of the major topics presented to the Premier in the 1982
Conference, and the establishment of a higher-ranked entity in
1984 later resulted in the Task Force in CEPD.
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3.3 EIA In Practice
Taiwan has the Bureau of Environmental Protection (BEP)
established in 1982 in the Administration of Health, as a major
agency responsible for EIA review and pollution control. The
Construction and Planning Administration (CPA) in the Ministry of
Interior is in charge of the natural resource and environmental
planning issues such as the management of National Parks and
natural ecosystem conservation. There is also a higher-leveled
governmental entity known as the Environmental Policy Task Force
, which is part of the Council for Economic Planning and
Development (CEPD). This was set up in 1985, and mainly handles
the nation's pollution control and environmental conservation
policies. The CEPD is an Ministial-level agency responsible for
the long-term developmental planning of the country.
In 1978, CEPD promulgated Taiwan's Comprehensive
Developmental Plan. This Plan was an attempt by the central
government to integrate a broader spectrum of considerations into
the long-term national development scheme. It was obvious that
the previous six 4-year and 6-year Economic Development Plans
neither addressed environmental protection as a national policy
issue nor spelled out the importance of conserving natural
resources for more far-sighted planning. After the beginning of
the six-year Plan in 1975, the central planners were alerted to
the ever-growing public concern as well as to the significance of
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integrating environmental factors into their developmental
schemes. The CEPD took over the responsiblity of formulating the
Comprehensive Plan, to meet such needs.
In this planning document, conservation and environmental
protection were listed along with industrial development as
sectorial priorities within the comprehensive framework. The
Plan pointed out the lesson could be learned from the
industrialized countries; that environmental problems should be
avoided in the industrialization process. As a rapidly
developing country, Taiwan was aware of the problems before it,
and intended the Comprehensive Plan as a first attempt to score
the music of development to a more integrated tempo.
Additionally, the Plan's introductory chapter included a
statement to the effect that an integrated perspective should be
taken to "reach the highest effect of resources utilization".
This underlying theme in fact made the re-organization of CPA in
Ministry of Interiors in 1981 and the establishment of BEP in
1982 possible.
The first EIA was prepared in 1979, for a new cross-island
highway project proposed by the Taiwan Provincial Government.
The terminology of EIA was introduced earlier, however, in July,
1976, in a "Seminar on Contemporary Engineering Techniques" held
in Taipei. Since then, many academics, mainly foreign-trained,
had been advocating the establishment of EIA system. However,
the institution of EIA system was not formally considered until
the establishment of the BEP in 1982. In 1983, the Executive
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Yuan gave an order stating that "any important public economic
development project, together with any private projects with
potential polluting effects to the environment, should have the
EIS prepared in advance, so that the BEP can review the EIS and
the licensing agency can thereafter make decisions on issuing
official permits to the proposed action".
Though the "EIA Enforcement Plan" was promulgated only after
mid-1985 by the BEP, more than eight EISs had been finished
already by then (see Table 3.3). The phenomenon of so many EISs
have been completed even before the Plan's mandate can be
explained by the strong advocacy of the academics and the high
level of concern from the general public. It should be noted
that some of these "early-bird" EISs were requested as model-
demonstration to the public by the Administration of Health and
CPA.
Diagram 3.3 illustrates the operational procedure of
Taiwan's EIA system. BEP makes suggestions, before going through
this procedure, to the Council Meeting in CEPD which will make a
decision on whether an EIS is required for proposed development
project.
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TABLE 3.3
EISs Corpleted Before 1985 in Taiwan
PROJECT NAME TOTAL
BUDGET
($Mil)
PRPONENT PREPARER PERIOD EIS
-BUDGET
($'OO)
PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL BUDGET
(%)
New Mid-Island
Highway
Fei-Tswei
Reservoir
Kuo-Shing
Reservoir
ShingTa Thermal
Power Plant
Coastal Indus-
trial Park
KaoPing Special
Zone
Ma-Chia
Reservoir
Orchid Island
Resources Deve-
lopment Project
Taiwan Provincial
90 Government
Taipei Metro.
310 Reservoir Council
Taiwan Provincial
500 Government
Taipower Company
1675
Administration
27 of Health
Kao-Hsiung City
45 Government
Ministry of
N/A Economic Affairs
N/A
Taiwan Provincial
Government
China Consulting
Engineers, Inc.
National Taiwan
University
China Consulting
Engineers, Inc.
Academia Sinica
Physics Institute
National Taiwan
University
Da-Han Engineers
Consultants
China Consulting
Engineers, Inc.
National Taiwan
University
Source: Bureau of Environmental Protection, BEP,
0.08375
30 0.0097
0.00840
7-8/1979
12/1979-
11/1980
5/1981-
12/1982
5/1981-
4/1987
10/1980-
9/1982
6/1980-
5/1981
4/1983-
6/1984
4/1983-
6/1984
0.0197230
500
20
35
1%0
1.85
0.04
N/A
N/A111
Taiwan.
TAIWAN'S EIA PROCEDURE
1 DEVELOPMENT PROJECT]
1- EIS DRAFT
LICENSING AGENCYI
2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: BEP
4 RELATED
AGENCY 2,3 4
REVIEW SESSION]
I within two months 3
L_2 REVIEW RSUSLTS
FINAL
REVIEW 1- IF I NAL EIS
3
(DIS)APPROVAL Responsible entities:
OF PROJECT 1: project proponent
2: environmental agency
3: licensing agency
2 OFFICIALLY 4: related agencies
PUBLISHED RESULTS
Source: BEP, Administration of
Health, Taiwan, ROC
To meet the requirement, a project proponent is responsible
for having an EIS draft prepared and submit to BEP, the licensing
agency, and other related agencies. The EIS should include the
proposed action's aim, detailed content, current environmental
quality of the project area, adverse effects which cannot be
avoided if the proposed actions are implemented, any
alternatives, and any environmental protection and/or
conservation measures considered. After the draft EIS
submission, BEP is responsible for chairing the review session.
BEP has to incorporate the licensing and other related agencies'
64
DIAGRAM 3.3:
comments into the review results within a two-months period.
Upon receiving the review results, the project proponent must
revise the EIS into a final draft and submit it for final review.
The final review process, again led by BEP, must include the
licensing and related agencies' comments, and the final results
are forwarded to the licensing agency for final approval. After
decision is made, BEP is responsible for having the major points
of the review comments as welll as the EIS's results published in
official documents.
The EIA Enforcement Plan also described the proposed
training programs for EIA personnel, particularly public
officials in related entities such as BEP, CPA, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, and CEPD. The program includes domestic
training and short term foreign training in developed countries
like U.S. and Japan.
Since the establishment of BEP in 1982, some 15 EISs have
been or are now being prepared, mainly for huge projects with
potential significant impacts such as thermal power plants,
municipal waste incinerators, and reservoir projects. It has
been reported that all the environmental engineering and science
departments in Taiwan's universities have recently been
"overwhelmed" by new research projects, including EISs
preparation.
Though the outlook for Taiwan's EIA endeavor seems optimistic,
there exist a number of problems and impediments to the actual EIA
implementation.
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3.4 Implementation Problems
Based on the papers and case studies presented in the 1985
"EIA Problems Workshop", several conclusions may be made
regarding Taiwan's current EIA implementation problems.
1. In many cases, EIA was carried out simply as a remedial
function to actions already implemented. The aim of
incorporating EIA into the overall planning process was usually
not met. EIS became a mandated without actual meaning.
2. Some EISs were inadequately prepared, or were simply
"environmental studies" and not assessment report at all.
Insufficient data and lack of any consideration of alternatives
make the quality of the over-simplified EISs unacceptable.
3. Public participation was not encouraged. No public hearing
was required by laws.
4. EIS preparers were usually consulting firms or academic
institutions assigned by the project proponent. The general
public has the suspicion that preparers could conduct the EIS
study without being influenced and/or biased by proponents' view.
5. Cultural factors also cause problems: Chinese are
traditionally " bad-news adverse" and are inclined to see
positive outcomes. However, EIA always presents "negative"
impacts to alert people. This makes EIA an " disappointing and
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discouraging" tool ( Lo et al, 1985).
6. Alternatives sometimes are intentionally neglected. A "take
it or leave it" attitude came from the project proponents.
7. A shortage of well-trained EIS review experts. These experts
have been gradually lured away from the public service to the
private consulting firms.
B. Lack of coordination and communication among public agencies
with widely different views and expectations toward the EIA
process exists.
9. Though having a great deal of foreign-trained specialists,
Taiwan's general public the government sector were still
"blinded" by foreign advisors' suggestions. Too much attention
given to the foreign consultants and too little faith in domestic
experts make the EIA still alien to most people.
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CASE STUDY : CEMENT PLANT/TAROKO GORGE NATIONAL PARK
National Parks in Taiwan are created to preserve the
island's diminishing open areas and to provide recreational
opportunities with a "conservation perspective". Both of the
cases prsented in this thesis concern sites within the Taroko
Borge National Park in East Taiwan (see map 4.11 ). CPA (
Construction and Planning Administration) in the Ministry of
Interior is responsible for the planning , management, and
operation of the National Park system. A Department of National
Park was established under the CPA in 1982.
4.1 General Overview of the Taroko Gorge National Park and the
Chung-te Cement Plant
The Taroko Gorge National Park has series of unusual
geological formations. It extends along the Liwu River and
Middle Cross-Island Highway. The Park has been described as
"one of the most important scenic areas not only in Taiwan, but
in the world". Taroko Park's boundaries (see map 4.12) were
officially designated on May 20, 1964 by the Executive Yuan. The
Master Plan for Taorko Park was completed in early 1985.
In a report to Taiwan's Forestry Bureau in 1966, the
area was described as follows:
Taroko Gorge is one of the greatest spectacles of the world
(Lurie, 1966).
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Also, in a letter to the Bureau of Tourism in 1971, an
observer wrote:
Taroko Gorge's most excellent scenic characteristics,
including the steep and high marble gorge and the narrow and
swift flow of Liwu River, create the apparent contrast of natural
formation of land. Such characteristics will continue to be the
most important attraction of international tourists (Collin,
1971).
In an evaluation submitted to the Ministry of Interiors in
1978, a consultant wrote:
The Taroko Gorge's beauty in rock formation is astonishing,...
should be designed as a national park, and treated as the "light-
house " of Taiwan's tourists industry (Kubo Mikio, 1978).
Finally, Professor Ian McHarg, invited to view the Park by
the CPA in 1984, stated:
Unquestionably, the Tarolo Gorge is a scenic resource of
not only national, but international importance. This resource
should be preserved for the people of Taiwan and generations yet
unborn..... Taroko Gorge as a national shrine, a scenic resource
of international statute.......This area should be developed as
a national and/or international tourists resort (McHarg, 1984).
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management used several criteria to
evaluate natioanl parks: landform, vegetation, water, color,
scarcity, man-made buildings, and adjacent area's scenic quality.
Using these criteria, the Taroko Gorge National Park was
evaluated "calss A" of very high quality by Professor Shin Wang
at National Taiwan University's Geography Department in 1983 (
Wang, 1983).
Twenty-seven mountain peaks in Taroko Park are close to
10,000 ft. high. The park contains the Liwu River and its
tributaries with a magnificent marble gorge. Apart from the
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MAP 4.12 BOUNDARY OF TAROKO NATIONAL PARK
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Gorges itself, the surrounding environment covers an area of
92,000 ha. of land and supports a diversity of plants and wildife
in a pristine setting.
The Park is the most frequently visited scenic spot in
Taiwan. Approximately 1.6 million tourists come to Taroko Park
each year. They generate about $ 25 million annual income for
the local economy.
In April, 1961, the Taiwan Plastic Group (TPG) submitted a
proposal to build a massive cement plant in the Chung-te area.
The Chung-te Area is a development-prohibited zone, located at
the alluvial plain of the Liwu River (see Map 4.12). The zone is
within 2.5 miles from Taroko Park's entrance. The Chung-te area
includes East-Taiwan's richest limestone and marble mines
(estimated storage: 300 billion tons ; worth hundreds of billions
of dollars). Limestone is a key material in cement production.
The proposed plant, if approved, would not only enhance the
total income of the local quarrying and mining industries from
$120 million to $ 437 million per year, but it would also
increase the local tax revenue by more than $75 million a year.
The area was originally designated "development-prohibited" when
it was set aside for the aboriginal high-landers of East-Taiwan.
Such ordinances are subject to change for industrial land-use
only if approval is granted by the Bureau of Industries (BO) in
the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
East-Taiwan encompasses two counties: Hwa-lien and Tai-tung.
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They are the least developed, least urbanized, and least
populated parts of Taiwan. According to Taiwan's Comprehensive
Development Plan published in 1978, the East-Taiwan Region (as
one of the four Regions in Taiwan) has 23 per cent of the total
area but only 3.6 per cent of the total population. Its out-
migration rate is about -15%. The "under-developement " of East-
Taiwan has concerned local politicians. They repeatedly
advocated for more central government's investment in local
infrastructure. In 1981, they endorsed TPG's cement plant
proposal.
The TPG is the number one conglomerate in Taiwan (total
assets: $ 2.2 billion, 1984) and the world's largest PVC (Poly
vinylchloride) manufacturer. TPG is famous for its effective
management and high productivity. Its chairman of board, Y.C.
Wang, is one of the most important figures in Taiwan's industrial
community. He plays an active role in public policy debates.
TPG's proposal aimed at building a cement plant with annual
capacity of six million tons. TPG has put up a detailed plan for
allocating the highlanders, building the infrastructure, and
construction of the plant. It is estimated that TPG will invest
at least half a billion dollars in this project. Starting in
1982, TPG has spent several millions in purchasing the land.
TPG's basic reason for initiating such a huge plant proposal
was that the current cement market in Taiwan is literally an
oligopoly. Y.C. Wang wanted TPG to enter the not-so-well-managed
cement production industry. He believed that new technology and
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management strategies might significantly lower the cost of
production and therefore the cement price in Taiwan. Though the
current cement industry has been in the doldrums since 1982, due
to a depression in the building industry, TPG forecasts that
future domestic demand for cement will be very strong.
The cement market is dominantly shared by five big cement
companies which do not welcome newcomer. Among the heads of
these companies are the former mayor of Taipei city, the national
policy advisor to the President, and a member of the central
committee of the ruling party, Kuomintang (KMT). They are quite
influential and regarded TPG's proposal as an unwanted intrusion.
The Bureau of Industries (BOI) predicts an average growth
of 4.4 per cent in domestic cement demand amounting to 30 million
tons in year 2000. However, the government has discouraged the
"over-growth" of the industry because of its energy-consuming and
capital-intensive nature. Strategically, the government wants to
limit the industry's exporting capacity. Cement is a relatively
low added-value product. Thus satisfying the domestic market is
the main objective. Additionally, the adoption of more stringent
air quality standards also makes the cement industry
unattractive.
4.2 EIS For the Cement Plant
TPG's proposal was submitted in 1961 to the local county
government. From there it was passed on to the Taiwan Provincial
government, and eventually to the Ministry of Economics Affairs.
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In January, 1982, BOI granted "preliminary approval" for a change
in Chung-te's land use from "development-prohibited" to
industrial use. Though the Chung-te area was initially not
considered to be, and in the end was not, included within the
Taroko Park's boundary, a great public dispute over whether a
massive cement plant commanding the entrance of Taroko Park
should be built came into being. Before the final approval could
be given, L.S. Chang, Director of the CPA (Construction and
Planning Administration) led a task force to investigate. CPA
requested that, after the investigation, an EIS be prepared
before final approval (or denial) of TPG's request due to the
project's potential impact on the Taroko Park. Premier Sun
favored CPA's request and assigned the CEPD (Council for Economic
Planning and Development) to complete the study. CEPD's task was
to make suggestions to the Premier for a final decison.
Immediately after the requirment of an EIS was announced,
TPG hired the Sino-tech Engineering Consultants, Inc., a leading
civil and environmental engineering consulting firm in Taiwan to
complete the impact study. In late 1983, Sino-tech started data
collection and preliminary site evaluation.
Sino-tech used the Leopold Matrix method to prepare the
required EIS. In order to fill out the 100 x 88 matrix (later
reduced into 25 x 28) cells, Sinotech enlisted help. First, it
invited a team of academics and specialists in the fields of
biology, geology, air quality, environmental sciences,... and
sociology to provide inter-disciplinary advices. This group
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included Ian McHarg, who gave suggestions on setting up the
general framework for assessment. Though his overlay method was
not used., his suggestions regarding a national ecological
inventory system for future EIS study was accepted. Second., for
the purpose of deciding what weight should be placed on different
dimensions of impacts, Sino-tech's staff attended public meetings
and debates on the cement plant/National Park issue for several
months. Because of the record-level public concern, Sino-tech
had no troubles tracking public opinions. They attempted to
incorporate the views of both the proponents and opponents values
in this weighting scheme.
The draft EIS was completed in early 1984. The stated
result was that: TPG's proposed cement plant in the Chung-te area
"might cause significant environmental impacts" in the Taroko
Park, specfically air and visual quality. Secondly, these
potential impacts "may be mitigated considerably if advanced
technologies in deep strip-mining with multiple hydraulic-drill
face in tunnel construction and high-effectiveness electrostatic
precipitators are installed".
The EIS was reviewed in two different arenas. First in the
formal bureaucratic arena, and second in various public forums.
Bureau of Environmental Protection (BEP) was the "official"
reviewing agency designated by EIA Enforcement Plan. Given the
national concern about the proposal, however, review
responsibility was escalated by the Premier to the Ministerial
level Council Meeting in CEPD. Attendants to this Council
Meeting included the Chairman of CEPD, Ministers of Economic
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Affairs and Interior, Directors of CPA and BOI, Head of BEP, and
the local County Governor of Hwa-lien. The importance of this
issue was fully manifested.
In the non-governmental sector, though not legally required,
the review sessions were very visible. Major TV companies,
newspapers, non-profit foundations, and environmentalists groups
like the Natural Ecology Association organized public debates to
discuss this issue. Many of these "semi-public-hearings" were
broadcasted. Representatives from TPG, local quarrying and
mining industries, local Hwa-lien county politicians, Sino-tech,
academics, environmentalists, existing cement industries, and
government officials from CPA, BEP, and BOI all participated.
The general public was invited to the open forums, much like
public hearings in the United States and other industrialized
countries.
As the draft EIS became public, TPG tried to assure the
skeptics that it will install the most effective anti-pollution
facilities possible. Many academics, however, challenged the
notion that industrial activities could be rendered harmless to
the fragile ecology of Taroko Park. They also raised concern
about the "second-order" impacts of other development activities
would likely follow the building of cement plant. In essence,
the choice became one of trading-off long-term enviornmental
benefits for short-term local revenues.
In July, 1984, the new Premier Yu, who assumed his post in
May, 1984, visited the Taroko Park and the Chung-te area. Right
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after his visit, he announced that only high-technology, high-
amenity-oriented industries would be permitted in the Chung-te
area. He asked that Hwa-lien county be preserved as the major
part of East-Taiwan's "tourist region" since it was not as
developed (or as polluted) as other regions. Premier Yu was,
before becoming Premier, the Chairman of CEPD and the head of
Council Meeting. Thus he was already familiar with this cement
plant issue. Though Yu's executive directive contained no
explicit statement about TPG's proposed project, it was obvious
that final approval would be denied.
TPG was fully aware of the significance of Yu's directive.
In September, 1984, TPG announced that its proposed cement plant
would be shifted to another site, Ho-Ping, farther from Taroko
Park but still in Hwa-lien County (see Map 4.12). The final EIS
for the original project was never issued.
4.3 Organizations and Coordination
The major intergovernmental conflict in this EIA was between
CPA and BOI. As CPA took the stance of requiring an EIA, BOI was
initially very relunctant to cooperate. Protecting National
Park's environment was an obvious duty of CPA, but encouraging
industrial development, especially revenue-generating ones, was a
duty of of BOI's. As coordination was needed, CEPD's acceptance
of the responsibility to review the EIS had a crucial effect in
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managing, if not ameliorating, such conflict.
A noteworty point was, as mentioned, that the Premier
decided to have the CEPD, rather than the BEP, review the EIS.
This indicates that the status of BEP as a review agency of EIA
process in the governmental hierachy is too low, and needs to be
raised. Two possibile options for doing so include granting an
independent ministerial status to the review agency, or placing
it under a more powerful ministry directly in charge of
development and planning. The ad-hoc nature of the Premier's
order on shifting the responsibility from BEP to CEPD's Council
Meeting was meant to address such problem. It can also be
understood that the decision makers only want to perform this on
an ad-hoc base since they, still do not want to see an
established high-leveled EIA review agency having too much say on
the entire development processes.
According to the Simon's organizational theory (Simon,1957)
goals are often compromises, more "satisfactory" than "optimal",
and are frequently used to adjust a situation rather than to
solve it once and for all. The Premier's decision reflected not
only individual values and commitment but also political
considerations. The overwhelming demand from the pro-
conservation citizen groups and the influential attitude of the
existing cement industry cartel have had unquestionably positive
effects on such a goal-setting. It was quite evident in this
Taroko Gorge dispute. After the CEPD reviewed it, and after the
Cabinet members tried to coordinate, the final decision still has
to be made by the Premier solely.
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The reasons for-the result in this case were partly because
of the hierarchical nature of the formal decision-making
structure in the Executive Yuan. Initially, Ministers held
conflicting point of view towards this event. Attendants of the
Council Meeting did not work out an agreeable solution by
coordination. In addition, the level of the external pressure of
publc opinions and interest groups was too high to be
overestimated. Finally, this Taroko--Chung-te issue is a
controversy over paradigms, a dispute on economic-ecological
determinisms. Decisions on this subject will affect the
environment of Taiwan, in a generalized term, into posterity. No
one in the Executive Yuan but the Premier can really be
responsible for the consequences of such a decision.
In fact, such a decision still closely followed the
directions given by an even higher-ranked officer, the President
of the Republic of China (ROC). The President has emphasized the
importance of the targeted high-tech industries recently in a
national economic planning meeting. After all, this decision-
making process exactly followed the extreme form of
centralization in the formal organizational structure.
The director Chang of CPA adhered very consistently to the
role he was assigned. Being an officer who is in charge of
national parks management and conservation, he took a very firm
stand in support of the environmentalist's groups. He integrated
his organization's goal, the expectations toward his role, and
his individual behavior quite well. But for the Minister of
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Interior Lin, there exists some incongruousness in his role.
Unlike the technocract Director Chang, the Minister bore more
political burden and risks and was therefore more sensitive to
outside pressures. Though being the very superior who is
responsible for the protection of national parks, he still
advocated for the cement plant that strict pollution control can
keep the Park unchanged, because his own power source comes
basically from those local politicians and industries who asked
for uncontrolled development. In this sense, his role seems very
ambivalent. Local prosperity and national park's conservation
both appear to him to be very important and put him in a dilemma.
It appeared that the consistency in policy that he stressed, in
which he argued for the continuation of mining rights and
granting approval to TPG, mirrors the inconsistency in his role-
playing.
As Director Chang of CPA, a foreign-trained technocrat,
insisted on the conservation of the Park by supporting the
environmentalists. The latter have formed, if at all, a power
base for the Director which he supposedly did not have before.
Unlike the Minister Lin, he was appointed mainly because of his
expertise and professional capability. The Minister Lin, on the
other hand, took his position by climbing the political ladder,
first in the local electral campaign and later in a provincial
and central governmental bureaucracy. The reason why Minister
Lin was so politically sensitive to local indignation is
therefore understandable. Even so, the Director Chang still
tried to manage the conflicting situation and narrow such
81
difference. He cited, very skillfully, what his superior said
about having the firm belief in overcoming threat of pollution to
the Park by employing new technology in the cement plant. In a
sophisticated way he interpreted it into a commitment made by the
Minister to spare no effort in conserving the Park. The
difference between these two officers' views, though still
sustained, became obscure, and the Director's role as a
subordinate was kept intact.
TABLE 4.3
Organizations, Groups and Interests Involved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BEP (Bureau of Environmental Protection):
An agency under Administration of Health, having the
responsibility of pollution control, setting emission
standard, and EIA review.
BOI (Bureau of Industries):
An agency within the Ministry of Economic Affairs,
responsible for the development of schemes in directing and
supervising the development of private industries in Taiwan.
CEPD (Council for Economic Planning and Development):
An Ministrial-level agency in the Central Government, in
charge of the long-term development planning of the nation.
The Environmental Policy Task Force is one of the Deputy-
Ministerial-level entity built in the CEPDin 1985, in charge
of the environmental-related decision making.
CPA (Construction and Planning Adminsitration):
An agency under the Ministry of Interiors, responsible
for public works, urban and regional planning, and
national parks planning and natural resources conservation.
County Government of Hwa-lien:
The county government in East Taiwan, having the
jurisdiction over areas including most part of the Liwu
River Watershed, Taroko Gorge National Park, and Chung-te
area.
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Sino-tech Engineering Consultants, Inc.:
A private engineering consulting firm with expertise in
civil, water resources, and environmental engineering.
Sino-tech is the EIA preparer of the proposed Chung-te
Cement Plant.
TPG (Taiwan Plastic Group):
The proponent of the Chung-te Cement Plant.
Natural Ecology Conservation Association :
A citizen group with environmental protection and
conservation concern. Headed by Mr. F.H. Chang, a Minister
without portfolio.
Cement Industry:
This industry includes 18 companies, five of those
dominantly big. They manufactured 17 million tons annually,
set the price, and shared the market. They wanted not to
see TPG's proposed cement plant become a reality.
------------------------------------------------------------------
4.4 Methods and Techniques
The Leopold Matrix Method used by Sino-tech has been widely
used since its inception in 1971. The matrix consists of a list
of development actions, and a list of environmental parameters,
the former along the horizotnal axis (columns) and the latter,
the vertical (rows). This matrix is of the "open cell" type,
which means that the cells are left blank and those investigating
the impacts fill in the appropriate cell by forecasting what the
impacts will happen as the intersection of each development
action and each environmental parameter. The original matrix by
Leopold includes 100 items on the horizontal list and a vertical
list of 88; or a total of 8,800 possible interactions. The
adjusted version used by Sino-tech involves a 25 by 28 -matrix
with actions and parameters relevant to a cement plant including
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blasting, trucking, surface excavation, and drilling on the one
hand; and atomospheric quality, scenic views and vista on the
other.
Each possible interaction cell is divided diagonally into
assessed magnitude and importance of the impact in the upper-left
and lower-right corners respectively. A scale of 1 (least impact
or least important) to 10 (greatest of impact or most important)
is used to note the magnitude of impacts. The U.S. Geology
Survey indicates that both magnitude and importance may vary from
short to long term, thus a plus sign is used to show impacts
which are beneficial in the short term and another sign sign for
long-term benefits. Since no two cells are directly equivalent
or comparable no summing up is possible. The resultanting EIS
presents the results of the analysis in the form of a completed
matrix. Attention is focused on cells with large numerical
values. Actions causing large number cells along a single are
also flagged for dicussion.
The matrix provided a grounded framework where project
actions and environmental components can be related to each
other. It also "forces" a decision by presenting results in a
visual format. Thus, it is a useful tool for enabling the
public and reviewers to interact.
Sino-tech divided its experts advisors into several sub-
groups. Each sub-group was asked to submit scores of all cells.
Scores then were averaged and those cells with the lowest scores
were deleted. This process was repeated two to three times
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during a three month period. More input from the public meetings
and mass media, together with the queries from the Legislative
Yuan, were included in later rounds. A final 25 x 28 matrix was
then performed. Individual experts thereafter assesed the
possible impacts in each cell to give the actual scores. These
scores were the basis of Sino-tech's conclusion in its first
draft EIS.
Some technical problems emerged in using this Leopold Matrix
method: One, the matrix structure precluded consideration of
higher order interactions while only channeled thoughts to the
immediate future and solely to the pairs of interacting
components. Longer term or indirect effects were left out of the
assessment. Two, ranking using numbers on a subjective scale may
result in adding or subtracting total scores for various sets of
impacts. Results obtained in this manner are definitely false as
numbers on an ordinal scale cannot be manipulated with plus or
minus. As the EIA's intent was to achieve composite, both long-
term and short-term, and accurate assessment of potential
impacts, these drawbacks of Leopold matrix need to be addressed.
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4.5 A Focus on Industrial Development Impacts
The existing cartelized cement companies, which have
dominated Taiwan's market for a long time, were well organized.
They cooperated in price-setting and market-sharing. While
exerting substantial efforts to prevent TPG from entering "their"
market, they hired specialists to argue against TPG's cement
plant in terms of market saturation and other economic factors.
In effect, they tried to form an indirect alliance with the CPA.
The companies also hoped the BOI would support them. But
BOI had mixed responses. On the one hand, BOI was in favor of
the EIA procedure because it might stop TPG's cement project. The
cement industry, with its energy-consuming and high-pollution
nature, was not something BOI wanted to expand. On the other
hand, BOI was against the EIA procedure because if TPG's project
was denied, this would continue the oligopoly of the current
companies, which was bad for the national economy.
A long-term cement industry development policy became
necessary, and in fact was ordered by the Economic Minister
following the TPG dispute. The EIA, unexpectedly, triggered a
planning process for this most important resource in Taiwan. It
drew attention to the potential environmental impacts of this
industry, and the inevitable trend of moving east due to the
depletion of limestone on the Western Taiwan. From this
perspective, the EIA had a beneficial impact. Though indirectly,
this EIA gave TPG a chance to demonstrate that a more efficient
technology and better management might be employed in a "dead"
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industry. In the absence of the EIA requirement, the general
public would not have been aware of the problems in the cement
industry. The long-term plan for cement industry development in
Taiwan wasstimulated by the EIA process.
As a result of the EIA process, a special region for local
quarrying and mining was set aside, far from Taroko Park, with
government-subsidized infrastructure to support a more productive
local economy. It may well be said that, in the long-run, this
EIA had positive impacts on not only local industries but also on
more orderly regional development.
The most important industry to be positively impacted by
this EIA was the tourist industry. Taroko Park will continue to
be the leading tourist attraction in Taiwan. A study done in
1984 (Chiang, 1984) showed that "preserving the natural
enviornment" was rated by both foreign and domestic visitors to
Taroko Park as a top priority. 95 per cent of the local tourist
industry's income derived from Taroko Gorge. The EIA in this
case plus CPA's planning for Taroko Park may lead an unique East-
Taiwan "Tourists Region", as requested by the Premier. This
symbolic effort, centered with a world-famous park, may help to
bring more attention from the international community.
4.6 Implications on Key EIA Questions
An ideal EIA, fully internalized into planning processes,
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would contribute to a reduction in environmental costs of a
proposed action, with minimal costs in terms of inter-
organizational conflicts.
The major problem in this case was that policy-oriented,
administrative discretion extensively influenced the EIA process.
High-tech industry policy, plus the newly established national
park system, "forced" the decision-maker to first ask for an EIS,
and later to be inclined to disapprove the proposed project.
Coincidently, the policy and discretionary orientations were
complementary to EIA's basic environmental objectives. It would
be alarming, however, if policy was oriented toward a "growth
paradigm" without control. To be more specific, if the
government had decided to encourage cement export and marble
exploitation, and the idea of national park conservation has not
been so popular, executive discretion might have directed the
final EIS to approve TPG's proposal.
The general public's concern in this event has reached a
record level. The social pressure against the exploitation of
natural resources and destruction of a scenic area marked a
growing awareness across the population. The government noticed
the wide-spread concern and responded accordingly by requesting
an EIS. In fact, such public pressure, whether was anti-
pollution or resources conservation, left the policy-maker little
room to advocate for developmentalism.
Public participation, though not formally required, was very
visible in this case. Sino-tech in the EIA process made use of
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such public involvement in both collecting information and
assessing impacts. Obviously, the above-mentioned public
environmental concern resulted in a dynamic participation
phenomena, even though formalized channels were lacking. This
problem needs to be addressed.
After EIA procedure helped TPG incorporate social and
political factors into its cost-benefit analysis, TPG decided to
shift the cement plant to an alternative site. EIA left TPG with
a good name for not polluting the Taroko while avoiding
unquantifiable costs. It also was useful for the Premier to
understand who is to pay the costs and who to gain the benefits
before making a decision. However, a wider range of cost-benefit
consideration in an EIA process was not yet generally
appreciated.
Furthermore, in the long-term planning aspect, EIA made
Taiwan's cement industry's long-term development plan
materialize. EIA led the government to rethink its industrial
policy in terms of energy consumption and added value, as well as
its long-term resources utilization strategies. In fact, EIA may
be able to play a crucial role in understanding the trade-off
situations in future multi-dimensional resources development
disputes.
Finally, the EIA process contributed to reforming institutions
and reaching more comprehensive planning. As the principal
participants, i.e., BOI and CPA, encountered some degree of
conflict, EIA helped in reaching common adjustments. This stance
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not only led to mutual learning and institutional adjustments
over time but helped better incorporate environmental factors
into an overall comprehensive planning framework. Through the
coordination efforts in CEPD's Council Meeting, EIA was
used as a planning tool in synthesizing both economic and
conservational goals.
One crucial purpose of EIA, however, was missing in this case:
alternatives were not considered. That is, the comparative
analysis of environmental consequences of all the other
possibilites was not explored. It was a basic goal of EIA to
consider alternatives, including a "no go" one. The failure to
consider this aspect of EIA surely hampered the effectiveness of
EIA as an planning apparatus and ought to be carefully dealt
within the future.
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CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY: HYDROPOWER PROJECT/ TAROKO NATIONAL PARK
5.1 EIS For the Hydropower Project
Taiwan Power Company, the largest state-owned enterprise in
Taiwan, initiated studies on the hydro-electric potential of the
Liwu River in 1966. After the feasibility study, conducted by
Japan's EPDC engineering company and reviewed by Electro-watt
Engineering Services company of Switzerland in 1970 and 1972, a
basic engineering design plan was prepared in 1974. This plan
was then approved by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, as the
"Liwu River Hydro-electric Engineering Plan", in May, 1979. The
Liwu River is the main source of water flow into the Taroko Park.
The engineering plan includes two main power plants, located
upstream and midstream respectively on the Liwu River (see map
5.11). Their capacities will be, respectively, 160 megawatts
(Mw), and 90 Mw, a total installed capacity of 250 Mw. The
initial benefit/cost analysis in 1972 indicated the B/C ratio
will be 1.07. After the approval in 1979, the Taiwan Power
company (later referred as Taipower) began construction of the
roads leading to the project sites.
This hydropower project was proposed and approved,
apparently, much earlier than the Taroko Park was designated.
The basic reason for Taipower's initiating this project was that
East-Taiwan's infrastructure was not sufficient in terms of power
supply, and that the project could serve as an adequate energy
source for East Taiwan.
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The Liwu hydro-electric project's proposed budget is $ 410
million (1985). Its capacity, 250 Mw, is only 0.45 per cent of
the overall installed capacities of Taiwan's power generation.
After three years of road construction, work on the project
stopped in 1982 due to the potential harm to Taroko Park. This
stop was requested by CPA. With the support of the general public
and the academics, the CPA succeed in temporarily postponing this
hydro-power project. An Executive Order given from the Executive
Yuan, asking that an EIS should be done before further
construction, was issued in 1983. This Order declares that only
if the EIS indicates insignificant impacts to the Taroko Gorge
National Park will the project be allowed to continue. At this
point, an amount of $ 30 million has been spent on the road
construction process and the project was 14.61 per cent
completed.
Taipower assigned the EIS preparation job to the National
Taiwan University's (NTU) Graduate School of Civil Engineering.
Professor C. L. Yien, scholar of international reknown in the
field of water resources engineering, led a group of researchers
in preparing the EIS. The "Environmental Evaluation System"
(EES) method developed by the Battelle Lab of Columbus was used.
In July, 1984, draft EIS was completed. Its main conclusions
were: one, the original environmental quality of Taroko Park was
only of medium rank,( 68 per cent to the ideal condition); and
two, that no significant impacts will be caused by the proposed
project to the Park. The project was justified according to the
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EIS.
CPA in the Ministry of Interior, however, was unsatisfied
with the outcome of such EIS. Director L.S. Chang of CPA filed a
petition to the Executive Yuan asking to escalate the level of
review procedure with regard to this EIS, from BEP to CEPD, based
on its national importance. Permission was granted by the
Premier to this petition in 1985. Before the formal review
process in CEPD's Council Meeting took place, CPA asked Professor
S.C. Chang at the Geography Department, also in National Taiwan
University to do the review study on the draft EIS. Prof. Chang
was one of the leading environmental advocates in Taiwan. The
review was completed in October, 1985, which reached the
conclusion that the EIS's result was "erroneously misleading,
analysis framework poorly-defined, and method used for assessment
inappropriate". A major criticism of the draft EIS was that the
assessment model, the EES which was particularly applicable to
water resources projects, was not competently suitable for
assessing the impacts on scenic areas. This review had an
explicit comment on the proposed hydro-power poriect's likely
environmental impacts on Taroko Park -- "very significant".
On March 5, 1986, a Council Meeting, consisting of the
CEPD's Chairman, Environmental Policy Tasks Force, BEP, CPA,
Ministers of Interior, Economic Affairs, Head of the State-Owned
Enterprise Committee, and the Chairman of Board of Taipower, met
to review the draft EIS. At the meeting, Taipower tried to
persuade those in attendance of the importance of the Liwu hydro-
power project, especially to East-Taiwan's energy supply and
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development. Other members, however, overwhelmingly opposed the
project due to its potential impacts. After a lengthy debate,
which was followed with great interest by the entire country, the
Council Meeting determined that the draft EIS's conclusion should
be invalidated, and that Taipower's Liwu River Hydro-power
project should be halted. The reason was that the natural
environment would be significantly damaged if the project was
completed; that Taroko Park would no longer be a first-rate
scenic area if water in the Gorge stopped for hydro-power
storage; and that the low B/C ratio could not justify the
project, considering its environmental cost. The review study
done by Professor S. C. Chang was cited as a major document.
Headlines in the March 6, 1986 edition of the Central Daiy
News, a newspaper run by the ruling party, KMT, proclaimed "Liwu
River Hydropower Project Halted, Low B/C Ratio Plus Potential
Environmental Impacts". The story described the debates in the
Council Meeting the previous day and ended with a comment:
"Though the final EIS report will not come out until later this
year, the chance of approval on this project is very slight".
Presumably, the KMT decision-making mechanism gave consent to
such comment. It was also reported that, after the meeting,
Taipower would seek options other than this project to supply
East Taiwan's electricity. The Liwu River Hydro-power project
was literally turned down.
5.2 Organization and Coordination
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Basically this was a case of high-stakes inter-governmental
conflicts. The dispute level is solely confined to the central
government, with little local politics involved.
CPA asked for the EIA process. The Committee of State-owned
Enterprises as well as Taipower regarded EIA as a project
impediment. Though both parties sought, as their ultimate goals,
betterment for East Taiwan, an agreement appeared hard to reach.
The need for coordination in this case was obvious. Learning
from the experience of the former case of cement plant/ Taroko
park debate the previous year. CPA initiated the escalation of
review agency's level from BEP to CEPD in a petition. Such an
ad-hoc meeting to review EIS was once again convened in order to
reach a resolution.
To the CPA, this mode of inter-governmental coordination
proved useful in earlier dispute; therefore, CPA would like to
see it happen again. The proponents of the project, however,
were fully aware of the "denial" possibility in such coordination
effort. Taipower therefore assigned the EIS preparation job to
the NTU Civil Engineering Professor Yien, knowing that the result
of the draft would be encouraging and the academic status of the
preparer would be unimpeachable. As for the Premier, such ad-hoc
Council Meeting was an ideal, solution, since it had already
worked in a similar event before, serving the policy aim and
helping to bring resolution.
According to Katz's and Kahn's theory (1966), an "open
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system" organizational model includes both the organization and
its relation with external groups. They described how an
organization must function in several ways at the same time.
First, it must find ways to maintain itself, to elicit the
support, energy, and cooperation of its members. Second, it has
to try to protect itself from pressures in the environment.
Third, it needs to solicit resources and support from others and
build linkages with other groups. The liaison between CPA and
those external environmentalist groups pushing for EIA is a good
example of this model. The CPA solicits resources not only from
the academic people specializing in environment-related studies
but also from foreign advisor like Ian McHarg.
CPA's cooperation effort with the BEP and the citizen groups
was significant. Director L.C. Chang, a young technocrat holding
an Master degree in planning from the U.S., joined forces with
the professionals in BEP and the environmentalists in the
pressure groups. CPA also obtained the political support from F.
H. Chang, head of the Natural Ecology Conservation Association, a
Minister without portfolio. Together with the pressure of a
concerned public, CPA succeeded in having the EIA prevail in this
issue.
The academics played very important roles in this case.
With their professional expertise, they either help justify the
project through preparing EIS, or invalidate the project through
reviewing EIS. It should be noted that, Professor S. C. Chang
from the NTU Geography Department was also one of the main
scholars who supported CPA's effort in stopping TPG's cement
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plant in earlier dispute. Most of the academics like S. C. Chang
were very stringent proponents of high EIA performance. As the
academics' expectation about EIA's effective implementation
remains high and the demand from them stays forceful, the ardence
and zeal from the sholars can be vital in eventually elevating
EIA's performance level.
The goals of the EIA systems were perceived very differently
by different groups. This phenomenon was understandable, since
EIA was a newly installed mechanism. To Kuomingtang (KMT), the
ruling Chinese Nationalist Party, setting up the system of EIA
was a new way of re-distributing political power among proponents
and opponents of development actions. Such a newly-initiated,
technically-oriented public function like EIA, as expected by the
members of the KMT central commi-ttee. which is the paramount
decision-making mechanism in Taiwan, could always bring about
some new debates, if not conflicts, between well-educated
technocrats and power-entrenched politicians. It has been noted
that a group of young, foreign-trained, articulate professionals
were brought to public attention with the propagation of the EIA
ideas. This resulted in a successful "new blood" inflow to the
relatively conservative decision-making entity of the one-and-
only ruling party in Taiwan.
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TABLE 5.2
Organizations, Groups and Interests Involved
BEP (Bureau of Environmental Protection):
An agency under the Administration of Health, having the
responsibility of pollution control, emission standard
setting, and review of EIA. BEP was one of the attendants
to the CEPD Council Meeting to review the draft EIS.
CEPD (Council for Economic Planning and Development):
The Ministerial-level agency in the Central Government,
in charge of Taiwan's long-term development planning. The
Environmental Policy Task Force is a Deputy-Ministerial-
level entity built in the CEPD in 1985, handling issues
concerning environmentally-related decision making. CEPD has
the responsibility of reviewing major developmental
proposals, either public or private, in the Council
Mettings, based on the Comprehensive Development Plan of
Taiwan.
CPA (Construction and Planning Adminsitration):
An agency within the Ministry of Interiors, responsible
for the issues in public works, urban and regional planning,
public housing, and national parks planning and natural
resources conservation.
Natural Ecology Conservation Association of R.O.C.
A citizen group with environmental protection and
conservation concerns. Headed by F.H. Chang, a Minister
without portfolio. The Association was one of the interest
groups advocated for the EIA implementation.
National Taiwan University Graduate School of Civil Engineering:
The preparer of the draft EIS for Taipower's Liwu River Hydo-
power project. A leading academic institute in Taiwan.
National Taiwan University Department of Geography:
The preparer of the review study for the draft EIS assigned
by CPA.
Taipower (Taiwan Power Company):
The proponent of the Liwu River Hydropower project, the
biggest state-owned enterprise.
State-Owned Enterprise Committee:
A committee under the Ministry of Economics Affairs,
supervising 18 state-owned enterprises, including Taipower.
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5.3 Methods and Techniques
Professor C. L. Yien employed the Environmental Evaluation
System (EES) method in this EIS work. The method was
specifically intended for use in the assessment of water resource
developments. EES is based on a checklist of environmental
factors. It is., however, a checklist augmented by detailed
guidelines on the use of information on each environmental
factor. Further, according to Warner and Bromley (1974)., it
contains "explicit criteria for determining what constitutes an
impact of a certain magnitude". The commitment to quantification
in this method allows the derivation of conceptually simple
techniques for summing impacts.
The checklist of environment factors is conceived in a
hierarchical format which is used to subdivide the environment
into 81 parameters. The first level of the hierarchy consists of
four general environmental categories: ecology, environmental
pollution, aesthetics and human interest. These are subdivided
into a number of intermediate environmental components. The
parameters were selected by a screening process on the basis of
their significance for water resource development. Similar lists
could be obtained for all types of development. To overcome the
problem of comparing and summing impacts, parameters were
weighted so that they were related to each other in terms of
relative importance. Once such weighting has been accomplished
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it is possible to sum impacts for each alternative and compare
totals.
Techniques used in social psychology, i.e. the Delphi
method, were adopted to derive appropriate weights as a method
for the determination of "consensus from a panel of evaluators".
Eight researchers from various backgrounds were asked to be
panelist in Yien's study. One thousand points, termed Parameter
Importance Units (PIU), were distributed among the parameters.
The next step in Yien's study involves the transformation of
pre-development parameter estimates into measures of
environmental quality to provide a quantified representation of
environmental quality, which can be used in comparison with the
post-impact situation. In this system environmental quality is
scaled from 0 (very bad) to 1 (very good) and can be defined in a
number of ways.
The transformation of a parameter estimate into a score for
environmental quality is achieved by using a "value function".
In this study, value functions are obtained for all parameters
and relate parameter estimates to environmental quality. Value
functions are devised for each parameter using the views of a
group of experts. The procedure can be briefly summarized.
First, information is obtained on the general relationship
between the parameter and the quality of the environment. Then
the quality scale of the value function is divided into equal
intervals between 0 and 1 and parameter estimates are determined
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for each of these intervals. This process is continued until a
curve can be drawn. All stages in this process rely on the
expertise and judgment of a group of experts assembled by Prof.
Yien and must be repeated for each parameter.
The next step of Yien's EIS involves the use of results from
predictive techniques. These techniques have considered impacts
on all parameters in terms of the parameter measurement units.
In the case of aesthetic factors it was expressed qualitatively
(i.e., low, medium, or high). Each parameter quality score is
mutiplied by the number of Parameter Importance Units allotted to
that parameter, giving a final score for each parameter in
Environmental Impact Units (EIU). Since all parameters can be
converted into these units, the values obtained were summed to
provide a total score for all impacts.
EES was also used to determine the probable environmental
conditions of both the site and its environs should the
development not proceed. In this way, the projected non-
development and post-development situations were compared. The
former evaluation (the environment without the project) is an
expression of a future condition of the environment, while the
latter is the expected state of the environment should the
development proceed (Dee et al 1973). A difference in
Environmental Impact Units between these two environmental states
constitutes either an adverse (loss in Environmental Impact
Units) or a beneficial (gain in Environmental Impact Units)
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impact. The calculation can be represented mathematically as:
m m
E = ( V1 )1 Wi - F ( V2 )i Wi
i=1 i=1
where:
E
( V) 1
is environmental impact
is a value in environmental quality of parameter i
with a project
( V 2 )i is a value in environmental quality of parameter i
without a project
Wi is relative weight (importance) of parameter i
m is total number of parameters.
Alternative projects were evaluated in a similar manner in
the Yien's study. Impacts were summed for each individual
design. The individual sums were then compared and ranked in
order of preference, the project with the least number of
Environmental Impact Units being first choice and that with the
greatest number coming last.
Using the EES has some drawbacks: EES conducts impact
analysis at a macro-environmental level. The small scale level
has been pushed into the background. Ideally an impact
assessment should have investigations and predictions at both
levels to give a truly comprehensive picture of impacts. This is
exactly one widely criticized aspect of ESS. Its rigid,
monolithic structure may lead to assessment with little
flexibility.
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One more obstacle in reaching the intent of ideal EIA is
that the list of selected parameters is arbitrary and not
typically good among other checklists methods (Andrew, 1973).
Also, as can be noticed, all discrete parameters are isolated.
Chances of interactions and chains of relation, e.g. the "River
characteristics" and "Water surface area", which are actually
related to "Apprearance of Water", were not explored at all.
This apperared to be, however, the most important factor in the
Liwu River--Taroko Goege scenic area.
5.4 A Focus on the Energy and Public Investment Decision Impacts
The proposed project was aimed at substituting the current
East-Taiwan power supply system. It is using high-voltage cable
to transmit electricity from North and West-Taiwan, which has
been quite wasteful in terms of power loss and technical costs.
After the project was halted, Taipower had to look for other
more costly options to supply electricity. This would have an
impact on the overall power generation cost and, of course, on
the utility rates to consumers of electricity. For the local
East Taiwan region, the impact would be significant since it
would remain energy dependent on the other regions of Taiwan.
Even though this project's 250 Mw consists of only 0.45 per cent
of the overall capacities in Taiwan and exerts no major impact on
the general situation nationwise, it still would have a
significant negative impact on local development due to the
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limited scale of the community.
As seen in Figure 5.4. hydropower as a future source of
Taiwan's energy supply will decrease from 4% to 3%, which
represents only minor protion of total capacity and will be
useful for peak-hour demand adjustment. The halt of the Liwu
project actually will not impact the overall operation of
Taipower. As the environmental concern goes up, however, more
Taipower projects will face immense opposition and EIA
requirement pressure. A recently proposed thermal power plant,
together with a long-planned nuclear project, were both
challenged on grounds of whether an EIS had been filed and
whether environmental protection has been considered. Taipower,
which is solely responsible for Taiwan's electricity generation,
will be facing a higher cost, never before incurred, of anti-
pollution equipment installation. Such cost will inevitably
transferred to the general households and industries.
With regard to the public investment decision aspect, this
EIA actually had considerable impact. After spending $30 million
in preliminary road construction, CEPD still decided to halt this
project in spite of Taipower's objection. An unusual philosophy
emerged: a wrong decision should be, and will be righted. EIA
here serves as a remedial instrument through a feedback machanism
when a public investment decision is made too early to
incorporate environmental factors. This should be viewed as a
positive impact of EIA on the entire public planning process. In
this case, access roads already constructed to the project site
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FIGURE 5.4
FORECAST OF PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY IN TAIWAN
Source: Energy Committee, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan, ROC
Unit: Million KLOE ( Kiloliters of Oil Equivalent )
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can still be adjusted to provide tourist access. In future
cases, if any, more careful planning with both public opinions
incorporated and externalities considered can better the public
investment decision-making. The lesson ought to be learned and
remembered. EIA may be, in this case, viewed either as policy-
instrument for long-term institutional adaptation and reform, or
as a means through which the learning process of organizational
change be possible.
In the whole process of this long debate, from 1982 to 1986,
the public, the academics, and the press have been very active in
participating in this discussion. It was said to be, after the
resolution, the most thoroughly debated and longest public
dispute in Taiwan.
5.5 Implications on Key EIA Questions
In this case, discretionary problems existed in the EIA
process. The Premier approved the CPA's request for an EIS not
because he knew the likely impacts but because he sensed the
general public's overwhelming concern. In such a political
atmosphere and under such social pressure, administrative
discretion was therefore exercised, and was complementary to the
intent of EIA. Since conflicting opinions existed in CEPD's
Council Meeting, e.g., those between Taipower and CPA, it is very
unlikely to have a rational or even scientific procedure to
guarantee an EIS be filed if needed, should a great deal of
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discretion exist.
The general public's concern on environmental quality, as
illustrated by this event, was very high. Academics were asked
to provide technical knowledge and conservation ideas with
citizen groups and the general public. CPA's request on having
an EIS, which obtained the Premier's consent, mainly served as a
response to such across-the-population awareness. Prof. S. C.
Chang's competent and serious review of the draft EIS, as an
active environmental advocate's technical effort, prevented the
hydroproject from continuing. In addition, CPA's attention and
initiation, as urged by the public concern, lessened the
possibility of a cursory review.
Additionally, the broad spectrum of public participation
activities seen in this case resulted from wide-spread citizen
concern. Given the government's tacit consent, the public for
the first time learned that public debates in the form of open
discussion may influence the decision-maker. The participation
phenomena started in the academic discussion on theories of
natural conservation and ecosystem's equilibrium, and then
further expanded into the debate on environment/development
trade-offs. Such ad hoc participation process appeared useful in
this EIA procedure, especially in informing the decision-makers,
i.e., the Premier and those attendants of CEPD's Meeting, what to
expect. More formalized public participation channels, however,
still need to be established in Taiwan's EIA and project
appraisal system.
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Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio for the Liwu hydropower
project was only 1.07, and did not consider other aspects of
entailed costs. EIA in this case assisted to combine other non-
economic such as environmental, social, and political factors
into this benefit-cost analysis. It was therefore obvious that
minor economic gains could not compensate for the environmental
loss if the project materialized, and the project should have
been halted. Adding EIA to the existing benefit-cost study, as
seen in this case, surely helped to widen the range of
considerations, and should be given more attention in Taiwan.
EIA showed another side to the economic consequences in this
dispute: tourist income would be decreased if Taroko Park's
quality be degraded by the hydropower project. Since over 95 per
cent of the local tourist revenue relates to the Park, the
everlasting protection and environmental management of this
treasure, either in terms of revenue or natural beauty, should be
enforced. Both local economy, and national as well as
international sightseeing demands, are better served by having
this EIA as part of decision process.
In the long-term planning aspect, EIA made Taiwan reconsider
its energy strategy as well as regional development scheme. East
Taiwan is now confirmed to be conserved as an unique "scenic
region" in the Comprehensive Development Plan. EIA also helped
to discern the trade-off situations between minor energy loss and
sustainable resources development gain. EIA's use in this aspect
could be further explored in Taiwan.
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Moreover, EIA served as a planning apparatus in adjusting
the institutional decision-making process. The hydropower
project was eventually invalidated through the EIA procedure,
even though considerable amount of money had been invested. The
conflict resolution and coordination functions of CEPD would not
have been successful without the help of EIA. In addition,
Taipower gained the insights, whether willingly or not, as to
include environmental considerations in its futural project
planning.
EIA played a limited role of environmental advocacy,
however, by suggesting remedial measures for a proposed action.
The main reason for this limitation was that the ideas of EIA and
comprehensive resources utilization did not come into being until
the proposed action already had taken place. The timing of EIA,
therefore, is very important in reaching a more comprehensive
project planning process.
EIS might have functioned, in this case, as a perfuntory
endorsement for the proposed action, without serving
environmental goals at all. The notion of trying to justify the
project in EIS was a major drawback to the intent of this EIA.
Technical problems of either applying the inappropriate method or
lacking relevant data, resulted in this situation. In this case,
the EES model, mainly used for water resources project
assessment, appeared unsuitable for the Taroko Gorge where the
scenic quality (aesthetics) was of primary importance.
By and large, the lack of environmental concern, or even
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sensitivity, in most proponent organizations, e.g. Taipower, is
another intrinsic obstacle to effective EIA implementation.
Environmental education, coupled with the propagation of EIA's
ideas to public officials, need to be strengthened. This may be
viewed as an expanded need to an environmental-concerned citizen
education for a rapid developing society.
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CONCLUSION
6.1 Taiwan's Development Level in the World
As Table 1 indicates, Taiwan has experienced "high-growth",
especially as compared to the entire group of developing
countries. In this sense, it is more like a developed country.
TABLE 1. GNP GROWTH RATES OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
-------------------------------------------------
( UNIT: X )
1960-73 1973-80 1980-82
Taiwan 10.1 8.8 5.2
Developing counteries group 6.0 4.7 1.9
( Average )
Developed countries group 5.1 2.5 0.4
( Average )
--------------------------------------------------
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, page 27.
------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, as the World Bank's 1982 statistics show,
Taiwan's per capita GNP is more closely aligned to developed
countries.
TABLE 2. PER CAPITA GNP IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
------------------------------------------------------------------
UNIT: U.S.$ (1961)
Taiwan 2,563
Developing Countries Group (Avg.) 987
Developed Countries Group (Avg.) 11,120
------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1982;
Office of Directorate-General of Statistics, ROC, 1982.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CHAPTER 6
Thus, in some respects Taiwan is more like a developing
country; in others, it is closer to a developed nation. Given
this phenomena, Taiwan's EIA system probably ought be shaped by
the lessons from both sets of countries.
6.2 Lessons To Be Learned From Developed Countries
There are various lessons in the application of EIA process
which could be learned from the developed countries. Those
lessons concern certain aspects of administrative discretion,
public participation, general citizens concern, and cost-benefit
analysis.
6.2.1 Administrative discretion and EIA compliance
One major problem in the developed countries is in the area
of adminstrative discretion in the EIA implementation process.
In West Germany and Australia, for instance, ministers have the
discretion of deciding whether an EIS is required. The same
situation exists in many developed countries. The lesson to be
learned is that: the more discretion that exists, the less the
possibility of having an effective EIA system.
This is a major drawback in EIA's implementation, because
the basic intent of EIA is hampered when the potential
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environmental costs are not considered in the project planning,
because projects likely to cause significant environmental
impacts may not be asked to file an EIS to inform the public of
those impacts. With such administrative discretion, both
policies with higher priority and political figures with greater
clout may dominate EIA concerns, no matter what the proposed
actions and likely consequences might be.
There are several factors pointing to the necessity of
avoiding administrative discretion in the application of the EIA
system:
First, in the EIA screening process, having discretion
actually does not enhance the political clout of the EIA-
responsible agency. EIA screening sessions will become arenas
for political struggle between those ministers related to the
proposed projects. Discretion, therefore, is like a pie to be
divided by various proponents and opponents. While ostensibly
enhancing the EIA-responsible agency's clout, but actually
increases the clout and input of all other parties to each
projects. More discretion, therefore, only means less clout. On
the other hand, the EIA screening session can be a more rational
and scientific appraisal process if less discretionary problems
exist.
Second, the decision-maker having the discretionary power
will be under great pressure from many sources, including
internal bureaucratic conflicts, involving difficulty of
coordination; and the lobbying efforts of external developers,
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which are difficult to satisfy. Dealing with such problems can
simply waste the energy and time of the decision-maker. In
addition, such problems are difficult to solve since both the
proponent and opponent of EIS cannot be satisfied.
Finally, in case no EIS was prepared due to a discretionary
decision, and a proposed project turns out to be a disaster with
undue impacts, the decision-maker will have to bear the entire
blame, along with the responsibility for any attendant social or
political repercussions. If the project becomes an ordinary
success without significant impacts, however, credit will rarely
go to the EIA decision-maker. There is no reason, therefore, to
have an EIA system with many potential victims risking their
political lives by exercising their discretion.
EIA's discretionary problems should therefore be avoided.
One major approach to solving this problem would be to improve
the content of legislation: spell out in such legislation the
specific criteria and scope of projects that need an EIS.
Principal criterion should focus on the dimension or scale of the
potential impacts. Systematic techniques should be used to
incorporate different factors such as project nature (e.g. power
plant); location (e.g. sensitive area); size (e.g. budget over
specific amount).
Taiwan has quite the same discretion problem in EIA
procedure. The Council Meeting of the CEPD makes the decision on
whether a proposed project needs an EIS. If no agreement can be
reached in the Council Meeting, the Premier exercises his
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discretion to make a decision. The Council Meeting is basically
a political coordination entity, rather than a technical review
one. Fortunately, the policy priority of the environmental
protection has been high recently in Taiwan, and the social
pressure is therefore considered by the government. If not for
the Premier's consent given to the CPA's request, there might be
no EIA for the studied case at all. Therefore, a more
technically-oriented agency other than CEPD, such as BEP, ought
to be designated as the decision agency. In addition to a set of
detailed criteria, a penalty system should also be included in
the legislation.
6.2.2 Public Participation
A second lesson to be learned from the developed countries
concerns the public participation in the EIA process. More
formalized public participation opportunities can help better
attain the intent of a fully internalized EIA.
Developing countries should examine the developed countries'
experience in having various levels of public interaction in an
EIA process, through participation, to reach more accountability
in project planning. This is important for several reasons:
First, a great deal of highly localized, unquantified, but
valuable information will be discovered in the participation
procedure. Such procedures may also provide some otherwise
unobtainable information to data inventories in the process of
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project study and appraisal, or serve as extra checks on
inaccurate forecasts.
Additionally, decision-makers can get to know what the
forecasted impacts actually mean to the group of people to be
affected. Quantified data can be interpreted and evaluated
through public interaction to facilitate a more humanistic
assessment. Not even technical experts, predictive machines,
or otherwise evaluation can be as useful as the informed
participation. In this sense, public participation will bring
the decision-makers a more grounded sense of what the assessed
impacts mean, a very important consideration to the decision-
makers.
Finally, participation can serve as an early warning system
for the decision-makers as to what the results of proposed policy
or plan might be. The decision-makers would therefore know in
advance what to expect, whom to consult or to meet with
privately, who will be their allies, and how to negotiate if any
conficts exist. In some cases, difference between public
expectation and policy ends can also be clarified and bridged in
the process of open discussion.
Since public participation is, generally speaking, not
encouraged by Taiwan's government, no formal channels are
available for EIA public input. In the case study, however, a
wide range of public involvement has taken place. Public
debates, somewhat akin to the public hearings in the EIA review
process in the U.S., were organized and drew significant
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attention. This notion of public review for EIS, though not
legally requried, was extensively employed for the first time in
Taiwan's project appraisal process. It is apparent that the
demand of the general public for access into the decision-making
process is growing stronger. A formalized and more extensive
procedure of informed participation, both at the screening and
review stages, utilizing the assistance of academic institutes
and environmental protection agencies, should therefore be
established by Taiwan's EIA legislation.
6.2.3 General Public's Growing Environmental Awareness
The third lesson from developed countries concerns the
general population's broad awareness concerning environmental
quality and the consequent social pressure. From the
government's perspective, the systematic implementation of EIA
will help to respond to the public's concern, which may win the
government considerable support from its citizens. On the other
hand, the general public's awareness of both the impacts on human
health and on the irreversible nature of natural resources may
lead to a more effective implementation of the EIA system, as
well as a more sustainable scheme of resources development.
Taiwan has an income distribution of high equality and
Taiwan's level of affluence has improved considerably in the last
three decades. The result of a 1985 survey, mentioned in section
3.1.2, indicated that 56.9 per cent of the citizens identified
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themselves to be "middle class". In the same survey, 59 per cent
of those interviewed answered: "the environmental protection
should be regarded more important than economic development".
This survey has demonstrated a certain trend, i.e., the
environmental awareness has been widely held within the existing
social context of a middle class boom. From the case study, we
understand that the concern for environmental conservation from
the general public has been strong. The case drew significant
attention, gained wide publicity, and brought the issue to a
national level. Major media, including TVs and newspapers, also
helped focus nation-wide attention on the debate.
Thus, the social setting in which Taiwan's environmental
measures such as EIA were promulgated is more like that in
developed countries', where environmental movement prevails
across the board of the entire population, than that it is to the
developing countries. The willingness to spare some time and
thoughts to care about the environmental quality is not a
triviality to Taiwanese but a necessity, and it is no longer
limited to the upper class' esoteric, aesthetic taste and
appreciation.
As a result, the college-educated citizens, environmental
pressure groups, and the academics in Taiwan, who are gaining
influence in the social context of a growing middle class, have
played a crucial role in having EIA materialized. They should be
able to keep playing the role in enforcing the effective
implementation of the EIA system, through various social pressure
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means, as their counterparts did in the developed countries. The
government should, therefore, pay sufficient attention to the
public concern by responding more actively in EIA enforcement.
6.2.4 Broadened Cost-Benefit Analysis
Another lesson that could be learned is that EIA brings
perspectives from a broader spectrum into the cost-benefit
analysis during the project appraisal process. This includes the
avoidance of undue costs in not only economic and political but
societal aspects as well. In this sense, the narrowness of
dealing only with the financial aspect of project planning can be
overcomed. Those unquantifiable and hidden costs of a wider
range can be properly addressed. Additionally, benefits of human
health, environmental amenity, and management of resources can
also be considered.
As discussed in 3.2, Taiwan's Fourth Nuclear Power Plant was
halted in 1985 by the executive sector due to the record-level
opposition from the citizens. Lack of communication with the
public in terms of risk and safety, cost and benefit, before
starting the project was the focus of wide-spread criticism. The
postponement resulted in various costs: higher finacial costs due
to the delay, the social costs of laying off hundreds of
technical workers, and political costs of local people's and
general citizens' indignation. Additionally, the Taipower's
Chairman of the Board lost his job. If there were an EIA
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procedure, such multiple costs could actually be avoided in the
future and the benefit of having the nuclear plant be further
understood.
Taiwan's decision-makers, as well as society in general, can
therefore use EIA as a tool for understanding who pays the costs
and who gains the benefits in a much broader sense, in a project
planning and appraisal procedure.
6.3 Lessons To Be Learned From the Developing Countries
Additional lessons can be drawn from developing countries'
experiences in EIA implementation. Those lessons are in the
areas of the economic consequences of environmental
mismanagement, long-term multi-dimensional planning, EIA as an
apparatus for comprehensive planning and institutional
integration, and in other technical areas.
6.3.1 Economic consequences of environmental mismanagement
In most developing countries, environmental goals are not
considered to be of a high priority in the overall national
policy. Growth and economic development is the main, if not the
only, concern. In the late 1970's, however, some developing
countries began to become aware of the economic consequences of
installing environmental measures, including EIA. This resulted
from the realization, through various experiences, that economic
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costs of environmental degredation and mismanagement would
greatly exceed those would be incurred if the the environmental
measures were utilized
A 1975 ILO (International Labor Organization) study, for
example, concluded that due to the U.S.'s 1970 NEPA requirement,
South Korea and Thailand has increased their export to the U.S.
during the early 1970's in those items such as preliminary steel,
non-ferreous metals, chemical products, fertilizers, and
pesticides, but decreased considerably in the exportation of
items such as canned vegetables and fruits, fish, fibers, and
other "clean" products. The total value change in gross export
was found to be, however, negative. Since many polluting
industries moved overseas from North America, because in the
developing countries environmental regulations were not as
stringent as in the U.S. As a result, these developing countries
were earning less foreign exchange while polluting their
environment.
This has been a typical condition that developing countries
have experienced in the last decades. Environmental resource
exploitation, therefore, should not be as sufficient a condition
as the labor differentiation, for developing countries, to
continue to embrace the manufacturing industries which cannot
survive in the developed world. While the economic benefits of
having EIA, among other environmental measures, are more
appreciated by the developing world, the trade-offs in terms of
economic gain and loss will lead those countries toward a much
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more environmental-sensitive stage.
As a developing country with export-led economy, Taiwan
ought to take such lessons to heart, especially in its role in
the international labor division of industries, and appreciate
the economic benefit side of EIA procedure. Taiwan's EIA system
can and should play the role of making its industrial development
more economically beneficial as well as environmentally sound.
6.3.2 Long-term multi-dimensional planning
Another lesson to be learned from the developing countries
concerns the EIA's utility for long-term multi-dimensional
planning in a national development scheme formulation. For
example, in choosing among various technology transfer options,
developing countries would like to be able to foresee the long-
term effects of multiple alternatives. An effective EIA may
assist in understanding the potential aftermath of alternative
choices, that is, what kind of technology is worth developing in
the long run, and what to choose to avoid the potential impacts.
EIA can help decision-makers in discerning the long-term trade-
offs. Most developing countries obviously need this tool.
Also, EIA can be useful for developing countries in
negotiating with multi-national corporations. It can be employed
to rationalize, if not limit, development activities with
unwanted environmental impacts within a more extensive time-frame
and multiple dimensions. A very recent case is illustrative:
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Taiwan is considering granting permit to a du Pont plant
producing Titanium Dioxides (TiO 2 ). Though the BOI(Bureau of
Industries) welcomed such foreign investment, the requirement of
an EIS leave the government more chips in bargaining for a more
favorable deal, in terms of economic returns and environmental
soundness.
Evidently, Taiwan should look into the use of EIA as a
vehicle for choosing among long-term multi-dimension development
schemes.
6.3.3 EIA as an apparatus toward institutional integration
and comprehensive planning
A large segment of the literature discussing the
environmental policy performance in developing countries points
mainly to institutional problems as the primary constraint in
integrating environmental concerns into the comprehensive
planning scheme. The problems are basically questions of
effective "integration" of environmental factors into the general
development planning framework. More specifically, integration
refers to the organizational task of both coordination and
conflict resolution in the fragmentary structure of
administration. These problems also reflect, to a large extent,
the intrinsic difficulties of synthesizing economic and
conservational goals in the developing countries, particularly
since these goals are usually competetive or conflicting in
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nature.
The use of EIA in developing countries can be a step toward
better and more comprehensive planning through coordination and
collaboration, bringing environmental perspective into the
general planning framework. In addition, EIA can be regarded as
an apparatus for long-term institutional change and a policy
instrument for institutional adaptation and reform. EIA offers
an opportunity to improve existing planning and decision-making
processes without creating additional complicated bureaucratic
machinery. It therefore bypasses laborious administrative routes
and serve as an effective planning tool.
Such "integration" problems exist in Taiwan, too. Though
the Comprehensive Development Plan of Taiwan incorporated
environmental factors into the overall planning scheme in 1978,
individual project planning has not yet reached a stage of
thorough integration. The current bureaucratic system in the
government is full of various conflicting ends with little
environmental sensitivity. Consequently, Taiwan should take
advantage of using EIA as a vehicle in enhancing its planning
mechanism beyond its current stage, saving resources and efforts,
and in heading towards a more comprehensive planning level.
6.4 Lessons On the Technical Aspects
Most of the technical problems faced by the developing
countries also exist in Taiwan's EIA process. For the most part,
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they involve the failure to adopt and apply appropriate methods,
lack of personnel, and lack of data.
For the case of Liwu Hydropower project, the applicability
of a certain assessment model, the EES, to the target area was
challenged. This illustrate that the ability to select and
employ the appropriate methods needs improvement. Utilizing
sophisticated methods and techniques basically presents no
problems for the well-trained Taiwanese experts. Where the
problem really lies is in the ability to compare various models
and the judiciously choose the most applicable and practical one
among them. This ability needs to be strengthened through the
experiences accumulated through conducting multiple EIAs.
With regard to personnel problem, Taiwan does not lack
technical specialists in fields related to EIA, but is in need of
management approaches as well as managers. To be specific,
environmental planners with technical background and
interdisciplinary management ability are desperately needed, both
in the EIS preparation and review stages. Proposed training
program should therefore focus in this direction. Furthermore,
training should be given to the public officials, especially
those holding executive positions with power over major
development activities, in order to enhance the environmental
sensitivity and understanding of the decision making process.
The last, but certainly not least technical problem concerns
data. In developing countries, baseline ecological data
encompassing a considerable period of time are hardly available.
126
Such a situation make the impact prediction, evaluation, and
monitoring very difficult. One of the underlying reasons is that
basic science research including baseline data collecting and
processing is widely ignored in the developing countries.
Instead, applied sciences and engineering are always emphasized.
Though this general inclination may be hard to reverse, a system
of "national ecological inventory", as suggested by Ian McHarg in
1984, may appear to be useful. An interacting bio-physical
system incorporating the inventory data and other quantitative
models (e.g. hydrologic, erosion, ground water, wildlife
population, ... etc.) could then be created and serve as a more
complete basis on which to build future EIAs.
Taiwan encountered such data problems both in EIA process
and in other scientific research endeavors. Given the small size
of Taiwan, its rapid growth and frequent conflicts in resource
utilization, and its wealth of environmental scientists, such an
inventory approach should be appropriate to either general
planning or EIS work.
6.5 Recommendations
To sum up, it is recommended that several steps be taken to
improve Taiwan's EIA implementation:
1. Specify criteria in the screening process of EIA, for
projects that need EISs, in the legislation to avoid
administrative discretion.
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2. Provide formalized and more extensive public participation
channels and procedures, in both screening and review stages,
of EIA system.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of EIA implementation to respond to
the public concern; and utilize the across-the-population
environmental pressure to urge a more effective EIA
implementation.
4. Use EIA system as a tool to broaden cost-benefit analysis in
project planning.
5. Utilize EIA as a means of economic benefit for a developing
economy; a vehicle to choose among long-term, multi-
dimensional development schemes; and a planning apparatus to
achieve a more comprehensive planning process as well as
institutional integration.
6. Strengthen the model selection and application ability through
accumulated experience by performing EIAs.
7. Train environmental managers and planners needed for effective
EIA implementation.
8. Establish a national ecological inventory system for better
EIA data.
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